CLAIMS OF AFFECT

Affectivity as a linguistic and sequential phenomenon

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Abstract:

This study investigates how conversationalists use emotion in interaction. In analysing audio recordings of American English phone calls, a phenomenon labelled "claims of affect" was found. These are utterances which a speaker uses to claim a particular emotion that he or she feels at a certain point in time and is related to a certain set of events. Linguistically, the phenomenon is versatile in its design. However two main linguistic constructions have emerged. Each structure relies on copular verbs and affective terms. Yet pronoun use differs in each case. The first person pronoun *I* is commonly used to refer to the speaker herself whereas the third person pronoun *it* is found to function as a global reference that refers to abstract items such as events, situations and various circumstances. Claims can be located in "pre-cause" and "post-cause" positions. The cause should be understood as a trigger of the emotion that the speaker is claiming to feel. Pre-cause claims topicalise the cause whereas post-cause claims elicit either an aligning or disaligning response depending on the activity the conversationalists are engaged in.

The responses of second speakers are typically empathetic. By doing an empathetic response second speakers claim to have access to how the claimer feels. In one fragment, a second speaker has been observed to deny the claimer her right to feel in a certain way. This suggests that one aspect of emotion is that it is a public, social phenomenon and not the private, psychological one that some researchers have argued. Conversationalists negotiate their affective lives with their conversational partners in order for them to confirm that their emotional response to a situation is valid. Their partners will therefore judge if this is so. If it is not the case, they will orient the claimer towards it as being an unreasonable claim. This means that they must be appropriate to the cause. If considered invalid the claimer faces a dispreferred response from the second speaker.

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1 Introduction

Affect has previously been thought of as private to the individual. In conversation analysis (CA), its role in social interaction has often either been avoided or denied. Only few studies have investigated the implications of emotion on social interaction (cf. Coulter, 1986; Couper-Kuhlen, 2007; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000 & Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2009). For example, Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2009) investigated surprise indicated by means of "reaction tokens" or "response tokens". These are closely related to Goffman's (1981) "response cries". Couper-Kuhlen (2007) investigated the phonetic features and interactional achievement of displayed disappointment. Coulter (1986) found that expressing an emotion takes an object or a justification. This suggests that emotion and affect are social phenomena that are strongly present in interaction.

The research reported here is an extension of these studies. It investigates what conversationalists achieve interactionally when they claim to be feeling in a certain way. These are utterances such as:

(1.1) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23[*]

*Ad: So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that,

(1.2) CH:EN_4157:JEALOUS:09:40

*Bro: It's horrid?

This phenomenon is referred to as "claims of affect" (or simply "claims") for two reasons. Firstly the findings suggest that conversationalists intersubjectively orient towards the justifiability and validity of the claim. Secondly researchers should treat these claims as not necessarily being indicatory of a speaker's actual affectivity. For their study, Ochs & Schieffelin (1989: 7) stated that they are not "[…] concerned with issues of a speakers' actual feeling states or the extent to which their affective expression is genuine". This means that the brain is taken out of the equation. Instead only the observable is in focus. This is an idea that goes back to ethnomethodology. As Garfinkel (1963: 190) says, there is nothing of interest in the brain to researchers of social interaction. This means that analyses of brain processes should be left to the neuroscientist.

[*] See appendix for an explanation for cross-referencing data.

This paper follows Garfinkel's recommendations and investigates the observable behaviour of conversationalists. What has been found is that affectivity is a public phenomenon that conversationalists use to achieve their conversational goals. Furthermore the study finds that second speakers can claim access to and even deny the claimer's affectivity. Couper-Kuhlen (2007) notes that CA avoids considering the role of affect in interaction. However this study shows that it plays a key part and is not passive in interaction. Indeed it is shown that affectivity is oriented to as highly ordered by the conversationalists.

Claims of affect appear varying sequential locations where they have different functions. These are predominantly before and after the cause that triggers the claimed emotional reaction. Before the cause they are used to provide an opportunity to talk about the cause. After the cause they are used to seek alignment or disalignment. The main types of responses to claims appearing after the cause are "aligning". In one instance the preferred response is "disaligning". The second speaker may thus agree that the claim is appropriate or inappropriate. It is the norm to provide an opportunity for a claims production when it is produced before the cause has been presented.

"Stance" implies a speaker's orientation towards something. Increasing interest has been given to the interactional properties of stance by researchers grounded in interactional linguistics and CA (see for example Du Bois 2007; Haddington, 2011; Kärkkäinen, 2006; Niemelä, 2005; Selting, 2010). The present study sees stance as inherent in the individual utterance and a potential asset of the a larger activity when it is elicited through interaction (Haddington 2004). It is expressed through the linguistic design of turns-at-talk that underlies conversational actions. This is somewhat dissimilar to the view of stance that Du Bois (2007) proposes. He argues that it is similar to what has been known as an action in CA. By taking this approach to stance, the present study situates itself amongst other research on stance from an interactional point of view. Claims of affect are here seen as a type of stance in that they convey a speaker's affective orientation and response towards a given circumstance. However claims of affect are also argued to be a conversational action in the CA sense. Yet they contain a stance valenced negatively towards something. These are typically used when a conversationalist claims a certain state of affairs is wrong. Thus, they are common in complaint sequences and troubles tellings.

In sum, this investigation analyses the phenomenon claims of affect, their sequential location and what their functions are. This has implications for how researchers view affect, feelings and emotion and their relation to interaction.

Chapter 2 accounts for methodology. It will account for the data, how it has been treated, transcribed and analysed. A brief overview will be given of CA methodology. In **chapter 3**, relevant studies are reported to contextualise the study. It is divided into two sections. One accounts for research on stance and CA. The other reviews affect in relation to stance and sequential organisation. **Chapter 4** provides a linguistic analysis of claims of affect. The focus of the analysis is on lexical choices and grammatical constructions. **Chapter 5** analyses the functions of claim of affect. It investigates the sequential environment in which claims occur, the response they receive and what they achieve interactionally. **Chapter 6** concludes the study and points towards further research.

2 Methodology

This chapter provides an overview of the investigated data, its treatment and methods by which it has been selected and analysed. The corpora this study utilises are CallHome (CH) (Canavan, Graff, & Zipperlen, 1997) and CallFriend (CF) (Canavan & Zipperlen, 1996). A research group based at the University of Pennsylvania recorded them for speech recognition purposes. The CH corpus is comprised of 120 phone calls ca. 30-minute recordings of American English phone calls. 90 were made to Americans living abroad whereas 30 were made domestically. The relationship between the speakers is either family or close friends. In all, the CF corpus contains 60 recordings of varying length. It contains only calls made domestically with speakers speaking with a Southern American English dialect. More information is available on the conversationalists such as age, gender, occupation and education. The only fragments that have been examined for this study are those available through the TalkBank Project (MacWhinney, 2007).

By listening to the phone calls, certain conversational events evoked interest. These were when conversationalists announce that they feel in a certain way with words such as *depressed* or *happy*. Additionally they use copular verbs such as *to feel*, *to get*

or *to be*. In these sentences they would refer to themselves using the first person singular pronoun *I*. These turns at talk have the following format.

[First person singular pronoun] + [copula verb] + [affective term]

They occur in "complaint sequences" (Drew, 2011) and "troubles-talk" (Jefferson, 1988). Complaint sequences in which a conversationalist implements a set of moral rules to evaluate someone's or the speaker's own conduct as being proper or improper (Drew, 2011: 296). Jefferson (1988) argues that sequences in which conversationalists talk about their troubles are ordered at the sequential level. These are definitions that will also be applied in the present study.

Sequentially the format indicated above would either appear before or after the source of the trouble or the reason for the complaint. During the course of examining more and more data, another linguistic format was found in the same positions. The defining feature of this format is the third person singular pronoun *it* being the subject of the sentence. This is followed by the copular *to be* and an affective term. This is typically an adjective. This establishes the following formats.

[First person singular pronoun] +[copula] + [affective term]

[Third person singular pronoun] + [copula] + [affective term]

These formats are basic for doing claims of affect. Yet they do have variations. For example, a noun phrase such *what a mess* can act affectively. Others rely on inference. This will be shown in section 4.4.

Searching the corpora for these formats and their sequential positions in conversation grew a data collection large enough to generalise over and thereby find and establish the interactional function of producing a reference to an emotional state and thus doing a claim of affect. The collection of claims is mainly comprised of women speaking. In one fragment, a woman and a man are speaking. Only one conversation has men exclusively.

After data segments had been selected, they were transcribed. This was done using some of the conventions of GAT 2 (Selting et al., 2009) and added conventions[†]. After transcription the fragment is analysed in the CA tradition. Presenting all the aspects of CA is a task that cannot be done here and neither is it the purpose of this paper to give an in-depth account of an already well-established method. Therefore only core concepts and ideas will be accounted for.

CA is rooted in lectures given by sociologist Harvey Sacks (1935-75) UCLA from 1964-68 (see Sacks, 1992) and a number of articles Sacks co-authored with Gail Jefferson (1938-2008) and Emanuel A. Schegloff (1937-) (see for example Jefferson, Schegloff & Sacks, 1987; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). In CA tradition, language use is seen as an organised and systematic conduct. One of the most basic constructions in interaction is the "adjacency pair". For interaction to be successful there must be a "first pair part" (FPP) and "second pair part" (SPP). These can be expanded in a number of ways. These expansions depend on the sequence type and the conversationalists' agenda. Typical expansions are "pre-expansions", "insert-expansions" and "post-expansions" (Schegloff, 2007). Adjacency pairs and expansions are the building blocks of conversation. What they do in conversation is related to the concept of "action". Each turn at talk is designed to do something conversationally such as agreeing or disagreeing (aligning and disaligning) or complaining, accusing, requesting and so on.

Each action proffers a projected trajectory in the conversation. In other words each action demands a certain type of response. This relation is commonly referred to as "preference organisation" (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). For example, rules and preference have been observed to apply for doing repairs on prior talk. A distinction is made here between "self-initiated repair" and "other-initiated repair". The first is preferred whereas the latter is not. Pomerantz (1984) investigated assessments and responses. Self-deprecating assessments by first speakers prefer disalignment by second speakers. This is because conversationalists do not want their self-deprecations confirmed. The concepts of disalignment and alignment imply the nature of a second speaker's agreement to the first speaker's turn.

[†] See definitions for an overview of conventions.

The analysis of a second speakers response to a first speakers turn is a powerful one in conversation analysis commonly referred to as the "next turn proof procedure" (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). This tool allows the analyst to access the conversationalists' understanding of the previous turn. So when a conversationalist is making a request, it is only analysable as a request if the second speaker treats it as such. The authors describe this as follows:

> "When A addresses a first pair-part such as a 'question' or a 'complaint' to B, we have noted, A selects B as next speaker, and selects for B that he next perform a second part for the 'adjacency pair' A has started, i.e. an 'answer' or an 'apology' (among other possibilities) respectively. B, in so doing, not only performs that utterance-type, but thereby displays (in the first place to his co-participants) his understanding of the prior turn's talk as a first part, as a 'question' or 'complaint'." (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974: 728)

In producing a SPP, a second speaker makes his or her understanding of the first speaker's turn available to the first speaker (as well as the researcher listening in on the conversation).

The advantage of taking the CA approach to analyse conversational data is that it provides the researcher with strong analytical tools to investigate what words achieve in interaction (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). The approach assumes that conversation is an orderly conduct governed by actions and rules where each turn-at-talk has implications for the next and conversationalists orient each other to the activity they are engaged in.

Another advantage is that CA researchers assume only certain technical a priori categories such as TCUs and adjacency pairs as described above. Otherwise categories are only founded based on what speakers orient to. This means that conversational conduct is defined based on "the reality of the participants" and not preconceived theories (Schegloff, 1996: 172). Instead the analyst develops categories based on what is relevant to the speakers themselves in the moment of talking by reference to the next turn proof procedure. Each turn is therefore always considered in relation to the next and never in isolation. This is because language is always assumed by researchers to be

contextually realised. CA as a method is inductive rather than theoretical and philosophical.

3 Research on affect and stance in interaction

To situate this study within the academic context and account for key terminology, this chapter reports on research into "affect" and "stance" as they appear in conversation in order to arrive at a definition of what linguistic and interactional levels they apply to. The key concepts stance and affect overlap. Many researchers argue that affect is a component of stance which this study will argue. This chapter will also argue that both affect and stance is present in individual turns and can be individual turns.

The chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 3.1 reports on stance research, its function in conversational sequences. Section 3.2 reports research on affect in interaction and its relation to affect and how affect can become sequentially significant. As this study is a CA study primarily, the bulk of the research reported here comes from interactional research traditions. Section 3.3 concludes the chapter by arguing that affect and stance are closely related.

3.1 Stance in interaction

This section seeks to define stance as a conversational "activity" and a significant feature of linguistic design. The section will ultimately arrive at a clear distinction between "activity" and "action". This distinction will be made from a CA perspective by focusing on sequential organisation.

Stance is traditionally defined as the linguistic manifestation of a language user's attitude (Biber & Finegan, 1989). It is commonly divided into three categories which indicate the type speaker's attitude. These are "affective stance", "evaluative stance" and "epistemic stance". Affective stance is defined by Ochs and Schieffelin (1989: 7) as the linguistic realisation of a speakers "feelings, moods, dispositions and attitudes associated with a persons and/or situations". An example of this is endearing nicknames. Epistemic stance is the linguistic expression of a speaker's attitude towards some piece of knowledge such as the evidence the language user has for making some claim (Chafe, 1986). The verb *to think* is an example of this. Evaluative stance is achieved when a language user is assigning value to something along a dimensions such as "desirability" and "inclination" (Lemke, 1998). An example of this is to evaluate a

cake as being *delicious.* Biber et al. (1999) complicate matter further by claiming that evaluative stance and affective stance are both part of an enveloping "attitudinal stance". They also propose "style of speaking stance" as a type. This type describes the speaker's attitude towards the conversational activity he or she is engaged in.

As it can clearly be seen, stance categories vary in number. This is due to the fact that in many cases they overlap. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the collapsing of evaluative and affective into one attitudinal stance. Du Bois (2007: 145) notes that a definite number of stance categories and criteria for these have yet to be achieved. Du Bois' argues for an alternative approach to stance which is grounded in "dialogicality", "intersubjectivity" and "actions" instead of a priori defined categories. Dialogicality refers to the interactional aspect of language in use where one turn at talk follows the other with implications for the next. Intersubjectivity is the meeting ground between two conversationalists' subjectivities. A conversationalist can achieve this by making her own views linguistically explicit in a conversation. Stance is seen by Du Bois (2007) and Du Bois Kärkkäinen (2012) as an "act" in the sense that it requires three actions to be achieved. First the stance taker performs an "evaluation" of a "stance object". This may be a thing, a person or even a prior stance. Secondly the stance taker (or subject) "positions" a subject (herself or someone else) in relation to the object. Finally the stance taker may respond to a prior stance and can perform "alignment" with a prior stance which can quite simply be defined as a matching of stances. This and the subjects that interactionally achieve stance when they position themselves and each other towards some object of interest are what make up the three sides of Du Bois' (2007) stance triangle.

When Du Bois (2007) and Du Bois and Kärkkäinen (2012) consider evaluation to be an aspect of stance, this is not to be confused with the evaluative stance as mentioned previously. Evaluation is not understood as assigning value to an object. Rather, it implies a particular orientation towards an object. Thus an evaluation can be "affective" in the sense that a stance taker can evaluate the stance object as having an affective aspect for her. For example, an utterance such as *it's depressing* is affective. However, this is due to the affective evaluation of *it.* This will be additionally highlighted in the next chapter.

As is evident from Du Bois (2007) and Du Bois and Kärkkäinen (2012), the interactional aspects of stance or what they refer to as dialogicality and intersubjectivity are important components. Kockelman (2004) notes that one of the tendencies in present stance research is to consider stance not as a subjective phenomenon. Rather it is instead intersubjective. This view is supported by research in CA (cf. Goodwin, 1986; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984). For example, conversationalists partaking in assessment activities produce adjacency pairs consisting of first and second assessments. A conversationalist may assess that *the weather is beautiful today.* The second speaker aligns to the assessment by doing a second assessment: *it's amazing*. Here, the first speaker takes a positive stance towards the weather by assessing it as being beautiful. The second speaker joins in by responding with a second assessment upgrading the initial assessment by utilising an upgraded assessment term (Pomerantz, 1984). By doing this, the second speaker aligns with the first speaker. Also the second assessment is made dialogically relevant by the production of a first assessment. The assessment pairs bring the subjectivities together in what can be referred to as the "stance field" (Du Bois, 2007; Du Bois & Kärkkäinen, 2012). This is a public space a stance taker enters when he or she presents a stance to another conversationalist's subjectivity. It becomes intersubjective when the second speaker takes a second stance towards it.

Intersubjectivity, dialogicality and stance lead into the domain of CA. There are fundamental differences between assumptions made in research on stance and research done in CA. This is especially evident with the notion of action. As it has already been reported partly in the methodology, CA assumes that conversation is conventionalised and that interlocutors orient themselves and each other towards this fact when they interact (Schegloff & Sacks, 1969). Schegloff (1972) argues that one utterance can be dependent on and required by the production of another utterance. If this does not happen it is noticeably missing from the interaction.

What makes this system possible is that second speakers recognise what a first speaker is doing in a FPP. The second speaker displays this by producing a relevant SPP. This means that she displays an orientation towards what the FPP is designed to achieve. This can be anything from a "greeting" to a "request". The amount of actions found by conversation analysts is high. Yetm ore importantly these actions are not the

result of preconceived categories. Rather the conversationalists themselves orient towards them as being "greetings" and "requests". These findings are made possible by the inductive tradition of CA. Obviously conversationalists do not restrict themselves to simply FPPs and SPPs. These can be expanded in multiple ways and thus construct larger sequences of occurring talk (Schegloff, 2007).

These sequences make up larger conversational activities. Activities are constructed of sequences of actions (Heritage and Sorjonen, 1994: 4). These can be anything from buying a beer in a pub to inviting someone out for dinner. These larger activities are basically what individual actions are used for doing.

However, some questions need answering. Where does stance belong in the conversational system and is it sequentially relevant? Is it a conversational action or is it an activity managed across turns? The solution to these questions hinge on whether conversationalists orient to stance as an action in the CA sense. One will have to investigate second speaker replies to a FPP with stance. Haddington (2004) argues for an approach to stance comprised of Du Bois' theory and CA. He argues that individual conversational actions constitute stance as an activity. By taking this view Haddington supports the view of conversational activities advocated by Heritage & Sorjonen (1994). However, Haddington (2004) does not argue that stance is exclusively an activity. Rather he argues that stance belongs to individual TCUs. This is at least to the degree that certain markers of individual turns can imply stance. When stance becomes an activity, the stance implied by individual turn can be brought forward and negotiated. The difference between stance and action is fundamental to both Du Bois' (2007) theory and CA. Haddington (2004: 116) explains this difference as follows:

> "In CA an action is first and foremost defined in relation to what an utterance is doing (a question, an assessment, an agreement, etc.) and moreover, what the co-participants understand an utterance to be doing. […] [W]hen we describe a stance (and consequently stance taking) it is necessary to pay attention to the "content" of the utterance, i.e. the stance that is indexed by the linguistic practices in the utterance and the Stance Object in the stance triangle […]"

This quote explains the difference between stance and action. Stance is explicit in the individual TCU's linguistic components and action describes what a TCU achieves interactionally and sequentially in a conversation.

Haddington shows how stance can become an activity by analysing newsroom interviews. He shows that the interviewer interprets a stance implied by turn design. This turn is intended to do a certain action. Yet the interviewer picks up on the implied stance and does therefore not follow the projected course of events. Additionally, he shows how an interviewer in a question/answer-sequence may propose a stance for the interviewee to either align or disalign to. In this analysis it is clear that stance has sequential significance. Haddington establishes stance taking as an activity in the traditional CA view of activities. The stance is drawn from the individual turn and becomes negotiated in an activity.

"Challenges" also orient to a prior stance. For example, Keisanen (2006, 2007: 255) argues that interlocutors in English face-to-face conversations can bring "[…] into question a claim or position embedded in the prior turn […]" by utilising negative yes/no questions and tag questions and thereby do challenges to these stances. What Keisanen also found was that these challenges interrupt the ongoing or projected activity. Additionally, challenges can be used for questioning the validity of some conversational action such as complaining for example.

Keisanen's study shows that conversationalists orienting each other towards stance as something inherent in the prior turn at talk and challenging that view will cancel previous actions.

Based on the reporting of this research, it was argued that stance is both inherent in the individual turn at talk and may be brought forward by second speakers for it to become a stance activity such as Haddington (2004) argues. Stance and action are two fundamentally different phenomena that apply to different aspects of language in interaction. Action refers to what a turn at talk does. Stance refers to linguistic content and the display of speaker orientation and attitude.

3.2 Affect, stance and interaction

Having successfully accounted for the role of stance in interaction and its relation to action and activity, this section accounts the role of affect and the different levels of interaction that it attains to. It will be argued that affect is a feature of stance. It can

therefore become an activity and be sequentially implicative. These are ideas that will also be supported in the remainder of this paper.

Only few studies in CA have considered the interactional features of affect. As mentioned in the introduction, this is due to a methodological assumption that originates from Garfinkel's ethnomethodology (cf. Garfinkel, 1963). Where Garfinkel alienates the brain, Heritage (2008: 303) argues that the rules governing conversational practice do not rely on "[…] the motivational, psychological, or sociological characteristics of the participants". Conversation can be thought of as a machine. It works independently from these unobservable parts of the human psyche. This has led to a reluctance within CA to consider the potential interactional role of affect as Couper-Kuhlen (2007) notes. This is because a researcher cannot observe the inner workings of human beings' private emotions as noted by Du Bois & Kärkkäinen (2012: 434). However this assumption relies on the location of affectivity. The question is whether it is a product of processes in the brain or whether it is manifested in the social reality. The first is practically unobservable by conversation analysts. Yet they have an advantage if it is a social construct. If this is the case then it can be analysed by reference to linguistic characteristics and without any reference to internal brain processes.

For example, Coulter (1986) showed that conversationalists orient towards affectivity and especially when it seems misplaced or inappropriate. In these cases the conversationalists will look for the causes of the emotion. Thus Coulter concludes that affect must always have an object which implies the justification or cause. His findings were based on analysis of interactions between a patient diagnosed with hebephrenic schizophrenia (disorganised schizophrenia), her mother and two mental health workers. The patient would do various emotional displays such as laughing and crying seemingly out of sync with the ongoing talk. When presented with these displays, the other interlocutors would try to locate the cause of these displays.

Although not originating from CA, the concept of affective displays relates in part to Goffman's (1981) notion of "response cries". These vocalisations are according to Goffman instances of emotion flooding out, overcoming and catching the speaker unprepared. Examples are for example *oops* and *ouch*. Thus they carry some indication of the emotional state of the speaker producing it. Response cries have been investigated by a number of researchers in CA. Here they are more commonly referred

to as “tokens” (Heritage, 1984). Goodwin and Goodwin (2000) investigated these types of displays in conjunction with assessments in two very different contexts to show how they are sequentially organised. The first is a Spanish-English bilingual context with schoolgirls playing hopscotch. The second is that of an elderly severely aphasic man interacting with his family. In both instances the linguistic features of the vocalisations are interpretable as carrying emotional content. According to Goodwin and Goodwin, the response cries convey remarkability about something in a positive or negative way such as being presented with a beautiful picture or someone breaking the rules of hopscotch.

Many of the utterances that the researchers interpret as conveying emotion contain paralinguistic features that are claimed to display “heightened involvement”. Selting (1994) describes this change in speech-style as being realised by pitch, amplitude, voice quality and delays. However these features alone do not convey emotion. Rather they have to be situated and uttered in the correct sequential position. Selting found these features in naturally occurring speech and found that these cues are used to mark developments in conversational activities for example arriving at a story climax. The findings of these studies support the assumption that conversationalists by using linguistic cues to orient each other to the noteworthiness of something in their conversation or in their immediate setting. This is stance at work in the sense that the speakers make explicit what can be interpreted as their attitude towards an object of interest. As stated this may be something in the conversation or the surrounding context.

Wilkinson & Kitzinger (2009) investigated the sequential organisation of surprise tokens. It is used to indicate that the propositional content of her just prior turn was unexpected. These tokens are for example “wow”, “gee”, “gosh”, etc. It is also interesting that some of the linguistic design of the turns preceding the surprise token is designed to elicit these. Eliciting a surprise reaction can be achieved by doing conversational work prior to the turn that is meant to ultimately cause it. For example, it is arguable that starting a news telling with a pre-expansion such as *are you sitting down* before producing the FPP containing the news *I’m pregnant* will elicit a surprise token such as *oh my god*. Their study shows that conversationalists orient to the surprise worthiness of news. This means that they will orient each other towards this fact by eliciting and responding appropriately to meet this end.

Couper-Kuhlen (2007, 2012) investigates displays of disappointment. She uses data from British English everyday conversations to analyse their sequential distribution. She found that a first speaker deploys a display of disappointment as responses to a second speaker's rejection of her request or invitation. The display functions as an acceptance of the rejection and is made with "subdued" voicing. This is characterised by articulatory characteristics such as breathy voice, weak articulation and low falling pitch. Sometimes there may (instead of a display of disappointment) be "post-rejection silences" or "weak agreement tokens". These displays often result in the rejecting conversationalist attempting to reconcile or account for their rejection. Affect is especially evident when the proposing party indicates that the rejection is unacceptable.

Important to all these studies on response tokens is that they are interactionally achieved. This means that they are not the result of speaker subjectivity. Rather they come into being in the intersubjective meeting ground between the two. Also they show the conversationalists orienting each other towards the immediate context of the conversation. This idea is related to Chafe's (1994) "immediate mode" and "displaced mode" of conversation. The immediate mode refers to the capacity for orienting towards the immediate unfolding context. Thus it simply concerns what is experienced at the moment of speaking. In opposition the displaced mode moves the experience to the past. Golato (2012) argues that displays such as response cries are founded in the immediacy of the conversation. Golato compares the German *oh* with the German *ach* and the English *oh* which are in some instances used as a "change-of-state token" (Heritage, 1984). These are usually interpreted as marking a change in the producer's state of knowledge and are thus interpreted as displaying an epistemic stance rather than an affective one. German *oh* is different from these in that it can also function as an affective display while being a change-of-state token. Golato (2012) argues that these affective displays convey speaker's stance towards the prior utterance. Golato also argues as Couper-Kuhlen (2007) also does that prosody and especially intonation are important assets for conveying specific types of affective states. However it is also suggested that different intonation contours may be used to manage sequences and not only be conveying affect.

This is an important point to note as it questions the exact function of prosody when it comes to sequential organisation and affect. Prosody may be seen as tool for

managing the sequential organisation and just emotion (Local & Walker, 2008; Ogden, 2006). Thus a linguistic display that may be interpretable as displaying disappointment may in fact be achieving some other conversational goal. Researchers should instead look to how second speakers respond to such interpretable displays. The question of the function of prosody as either conveying affect or managing the sequential organisation is not necessarily a question of one or the other. It may be that they are interwoven. It is a methodological problem that something can be sequentially implicative exclusively based on linguistic design regardless of speaker intention, affect and orientation to the conversation. The question boils down to whether or not interaction and the sequential organisation of interaction are vessels for or the result of internal psychological mechanisms. Enfield & Levinson (2006: 15) point out that "[t]he ability to recognize others' states of mind, whether attentional or volitional and to share these states of mind through mutual focus in the ongoing course of interaction, is indispensable to human sociality". They argue that interaction is partly grounded in the psychological and cognitional capacity for attending to the states of minds of others and self. The same idea is supported by Du Bois and Kärkkäinen (2012: 434) who underline the importance of acknowledging that "[…] the reality that emotion is in principle present in interaction, at least as a potentiality via its projectable consequences on many levels". This implies that affect is fuel in the engine that comprises social interaction. As already accounted for, this is contrary to the view advocated by Heritage (2008) and common to CA. Interaction is in CA seen as structured practices facilitating the linguistic manifestation of affect rather than interactional practices being the result of internal and private psychological states.

Returning to Coulter (1986) may provide a solution to this problem. He argued that emotion always takes an object which is the source of the emotion. Prior to Coulter, Hochschild (1979, 1983) argued that adult emotion is highly ordered and contextually salient. This is due to emotion being dependent to what she characterises as "emotion rules" and "emotion work". Working on an emotion implies shaping and managing it to fit a situation. Feeling rules apply to a person's right/justification for feeling in a certain way in a certain situation. Emotions are variable to different contexts. Certain situations call or do not call for various emotions. This implies that emotions are seen as appropriate to the cause.

This idea has consequences for the assumption that all emotion is private and a product of biological processes in the brain. Rather it suggests that affectivity is a social phenomenon. Indeed much of the research reported here can be argued to support affect as a social act and something conversationalists can be held accountable for and orient each other towards. For example conversationalists convey that their conversational partner should display surprise when presented with some information. Thus the speaker will express her stance by linguistic means to interactionally evoke a display of affect.

The CA studies reported here indicate that affectivity can be achieved and oriented to at the linguistic level. The studies have also shown that affectivity is socially structured. It may be hypothesised that language plays a large part in making this happen. The advantage of being able to make public one's affectivity may be profound. It can allow the speaker to impose an agenda. This study extends the notion of affective displays to claims of affect which are made in order to achieve a conversational goal. In other words, they display the speaker's affective orientation to the conversation by means of both the immediate and displaced modes of talking (Chafe, 1994).

3.3 Preliminary conclusion

This chapter reviewed prior research on stance and affect. Affect was argued to belong to stance as a subcomponent that makes itself explicit when conversationalists display an affective orientation towards some set of circumstances. This is for example evident when conversationalists do a surprise response token (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2009) or convey disappointment due to rejection of a proposition (Couper-Kuhlen, 2007, 2012). Affect was also argued not to be a phenomenon of the brain but a social construction realised by linguistic means. Stance and action were argued to apply to different areas of language in use. Stance has to do with the content of the utterance and what linguistic choices have been made to convey the speaker's affective or epistemic attitude (Haddington, 2004). Action on the other hand refers what an utterance is designed to achieve in a conversation. Thus an utterance can be used to make a rejection to a proposition or invitation and thereby achieve a conversational goal. Stance may be present in interaction. However it is never an action in the CA sense. Rather it can become an activity where conversationalists intersubjectively negotiate and challenge stances over multiple turns of speech that can be observed in news interviews.

4 The linguistic formats of claims of affect

This chapter describes the linguistic formats claims of affect in conversation. The following two formats account for the main types of claims

[I] +[to be, to get or *to feel] + [affective term]*

[It] + [to be] + [affective term]

These two variations are shown in the fragments below. However they can occur with variation as will be shown on the following pages.

(4.1) CH:EN_5907:SO_TIRED:01:25

*Han: O:h i think i'm dePRESSed.

(4.2) CH:EN_4157:SO_JEALOUS:09:40

*Bro: It's horrid?

In these two utterances, a claim is being made about the way the interlocutors feel about something. The term claim of affect is used to refer to the action of claiming to feel in a certain way. This chapter will show how this is done by linguistic means. The next chapter will show what implications this has sequentially. In fragment 1 Hannah claims to be depressed due to some set of circumstances which are not referred to in the claim itself. In fragment 2 Brooke perceives something, which is referred to as "it", as being horrid. In both fragments a negative affective term is being used to convey an affective state. This is most clear in fragment 1 where fragment 2 will rely on more descriptive work to prove this claim.

In order to provide a thorough description of claims of affect, this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 examines reference with regards to the pronouns *it* and *I*. Section 4.2 investigates temporality, copula use and meaning. Section 4.3 analyses the subject complement. In section 4.4 additional structures are analysed and discussed as a candidates for claims of affect. This is to stress that claims of affect may linguistically be realised in a number of ways. Ultimately section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

4.1 Referential properties

Formats utilising the pronoun *I* are referentially the most straightforward. This pronoun indicates the speaker as the owner of the claim. This can be seen in the following two fragments.

(4.1.1) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23

*Ad: So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that,

(4.1.2) CH:EN_4157:JEALOUS:09:02

*Bro: Oh my wa:ve must have struck early then because everybody i know is married or getting married and **i'm (.) SO jealous.**

In each case the speaker refers to herself with the first person singular pronoun *I* and establishes herself as the owner of the affective state. As simple as structure A is in terms of referential pronouns, structure B relies on intricate referential properties.

(4.1.3) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:05:26

*Amy: <<f> But it's STINky.>

(4.1.4) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:07:13

*Pat: **It has (.) bee:n**
(0.2)
*Amy: (M[:)
*Pat: **[horrific.**

This format resembles post-positioned assessments. These are produced after an assessable item (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987: 20). In assessments the pronoun *it* is used anaphorically to refer to the assessable. With claims of affect it can be argued that the pronoun *it* is referentially "empty" (Crystal, 2008: 168). This means that there are no obvious referents. This is a grammatical function of English as a Germanic language that demand a grammatical subject (König, 1994). However with claims of affect this pronoun behaves differently here. To show that the pronoun *it* is what is here called a "global reference", fragment 3 is expanded below.

(4.1.5) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:03:13

82 *Pat: °h <<all> I haven't seen june.> How is june doing?
83 *Amy: Oh i just TAlked to her. She had another setback about
84 (.) two weeks ago. She had a small stroke.
[…]
178 *Amy: It wasn't until the end that (.) that judy
179 (0.5)

```
180           wasn't
181           (0.3)
182           so well ( ) wasn't feeling so well again?
183           (0.9)
184 *Pat:      U:[ah     ]
185 *Amy:        [<f>But] it's stinky.>
```

It is the function of the global reference to refer to large and abstract referents such as situations, circumstances and events. It is not possible to locate a single referent in these cases. In lines 178-82, Amy is concluding her narrative by stating Judy has not been *feeling so well again*. Patricia produces *u:ah* in line 184 which can be interpreted as displaying sympathy with Judy. Overlapping Patricia's turn, Amy produces a claim of affect using the pronoun *it*. It could be that *it* refers back to lines 178-82 immediately prior. Yet there is no clear referent here either. Also Amy's use of the disjunctive conjunction indicates incoherence between the prior and subsequent. Thus the utterance can be interpreted not as claiming that it is *stinky* that June is not feeling well. Rather *it* is stinky having a friend with cancer and going through this with her. It is a larger and more abstract referent which the pronoun is used to refer to.

Another similar case is Patricia producing a narrative about a friend's serious bike accident. She does a claim of affect in line 266 in a juxtaposed sentence.

(4.1.6) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:06:30

```
231 *Pat:     But
232           (0.3)
233           The (.) they they don't know if it was a bad bike
234           accident or
235           (0.4)
236           major stroke (.) th[at (.) crea]ted the bike
237 *Amy:                        [Uh      huh]
238 *Pat:     But  [he  ] is
239 *Amy:          [yeah]
240           (0.2)
241 *Pat      Ah he nearly died. We- we've spent a lot of time
242           there, He was
              […]
256 *Pat:     But he's PAralysed on one [side and he's]
257 *Amy:                               [O:h [(.)   go]::d.
258           (0.2)
259 *Pat:     bli (.) half blin[d and then he's]
260 *Amy:                      [O:h            ] what a shame.=
261 *Pat:     =<<f> And>  [so that>   ]
262 *Amy:                 [Is he about] (.) tim's age?
263           (0.4)
264 *Pat:     <<f> Yea[h> a]nd it i mean he's (.) REALly a very
265 *Amy:             [Yeah]
266 *Pat:     good friend and it'[s been hor]rible.
```

Patricia does an assessment and a claim of affect in two juxtaposed sentences in lines 264-66. First she characterises her friend as *really a very good friend.* The claim itself is *it's been horrible*. The fact that Patricia has been greatly involved justifies her being affected by it and it is the entire involvement, experience and accident which she claims to be horrible. Additional evidence can be found prior where she uses multiple formulations such as *bad bike accident*, *major stroke* and *nearly died.* These are "extreme case formulations" (Pomerantz, 1986). She also says, *we've spent a lot of time there* (line 245). This assumes that she and whoever else inferred by the pronoun *we* have been involved. The assessment she does in line 264 is also particularly interesting syntactically with regards to the placement of the adverb *really*. The question is exactly what this is modifying. Possibly it modifies the noun *friend*. By doing this she upgrades it. It may also be that it modifies the entire sentence. Both are equally plausible interpretations as it is not clearly deducible with the production what it is modifying. However it can be noted that Patricia by using this upgrade and others such as *a very good friend*, she indicates that she is closely involved with this man. Thus she underlines her justifiability for being emotionally engaged.

In sum this section has found that two types of pronouns are used in taking a stance. Use of the first person pronoun attributes the stance directly to its stance taker. The third person singular pronoun *it* is used as global reference that refers to larger and more abstract referents such as events, circumstances and situations.

4.2 Verb meaning and temporality

Having successfully analysed the referential properties of pronouns used for creating claims of affect, the present section will discuss how verbs are used to create a link between the subject and the predicate adjective which in claims of affect are affective terms. The three main verbs found in the data are *to be*, *to feel* and *to get*. Although these are copulas with slightly different meanings, the main function of the copula is:

> "[…] to link a subject with a predicate that cannot carry tense and agreement morphology. This verb is a copula (from the Latin copulare 'to link') if the predicate is nonverbal (nouns, prepositional phrases, adjectives, adverbs) and an auxiliary if the predicate is verbal (progressive participles, past participles),

although the two uses are commonly conflated under the term copula." (Walker, 2006: 197).

To be is the most common copular verb in the English language (Crystal, 2008: 116). Semantically it has little meaning (Croft & Cruse, 2004: 253) and serves mainly to link a subject with a predicate. *To feel* and the less frequent *to get* are different. Their function can be seen as action verbs but also as copulas. The following fragments show these in actual utterances:

(4.2.1) CH:EN_4861:PANICKED:00:46

*Jul: Do you know how (.) PAnicked i **get** over that?

(4.2.2) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:41

*Deb: [But i] **feel**
*Sar: [mhmm]
(0.7)
*Deb: so guilty and horrible […]

(4.2.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:21:27

*Deb: He was the one that got up and walked away,
And i (.) i just **feel** so guilty about that.

(4.2.4) CH:EN_6265:TRIPPING:11:39

*Har: (I could jus-) it'**s** it'**s** sad sometimes around here.

(4.2.5) CH:EN_5254:RELIEVED:00:40

*Mar: !NO:! i'm i'm relieved […]

The meaning difference between *to get, to be* and *to feel* is concerned with the different aspects of the relationship between the subject and the predicate. In fragment 1 the copula *to get* is contained within a complement phrase embedded in a question. It creates a link between Julianne who refers to herself with *I* and predicate adjective *panicked*. The prepositional phrase *over that* refers back to the cause. The verb implies a change in the affective state when presented with the cause. Consequently, the subject goes from a state of non-panic to a state of panic.

The verb *to be* is used such as in fragment 5 to establish a definite relationship between the subject and the predicate adjective and thus establish a definite claim of affect. It creates a link between the subject and the predicate *relieved.* As a result the linguistic design establishes that *relieved* is an affective state that Marie finds herself to

be in. In fragment 4 the case is that Harriet perceives some situation or geographical location as being *sad.*

Some verbs are based on sensory perception (Rojo & Valenzuela, 2005). These verbs are used to describe our experience of the world for example through vision or touch. The verb *feel* is an example of a perceptual verb. It can be used to describe the somatic feel of objects. Yet it can also be used to describe the feel of affectivity. Thus you can feel *guilty* and *horrible.* However using *to be* would cause change in the meaning. It can be argued that *to feel guilty* creates the meaning of feeling similar to being *guilty.* Again this implies that the speaker has done something wrong. However feeling *horrible* does not work in the same manner. Arguably, it is used in this context to evaluate a mode of feeling. If *to be* was used, then *horrible* would be a feature of the subject and not the affectivity. The following fragment exemplifies this additionally.

(4.2.6) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:22:02

*Deb: I feel good about that,

Although this claim of affect is positive where prior claims have been negative, it can be used to exemplify the function of the verb. Here Deborah refers to herself with the pronoun *I* followed by the verb *feel* which establishes a sensory link between the subject and the predicate *good.* It can be argued that Deborah claims to feel *good.* This means that she perceives her affectivity as being good. The prepositional phrase *about that* refers to what it is that Deborah feels herself good about. Perhaps this is something she has done or has not done. This suggests that the verb *feel* has an introspective orientation. This means that the speaker uses it to orient to her perception of her mode of feeling. Using *to be* creates an evaluation. Thus if Deborah had used this with *good*, it would have been more attributive to her rather than an aspect of her mode of feeling.

Considering temporality, past and perfect tenses are commonly used in the claims of affect found in this data collection. Additionally the past and present perfect tenses are found to indicate the duration of the affective state. Claims of affect are made with mainly declarative sentence types. Yet only one interrogative formulation has been encountered. As shown in fragments 1-5, speakers can make use of the present tense forms of the verbs *to be, to get and to feel like* to claim affect. *To be* is in each case

contracted. This is the case when -*'m* is preceded with a first person singular pronoun and -*'s* is when a third person singular pronoun is used.

The following fragments show claims of affect made in the past tense.

(4.2.7) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:16:49

*Deb: <<all> I **was**> VEry uncomfortable with it.

(4.2.8) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:24

*Deb: It **was** awful […]

This construction allows the speaker to claim affect isolated to the past. It is commonly observed in narratives describing a situation where the speaker claims to feel in a certain way.

The following fragment is an instance of *to feel* in the past tense. This tense has only been found alongside first person singular pronouns occupying the grammatical subject position of the sentence.

(4.2.9) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:17:05

*Deb: I just felt (0.2) too
(0.4)
was like uncomfortable […]

Although Deborah abandons her initial TCU, the use of the past tense is similar here compared with the prior two fragments. The conversationalist is claiming that she felt uncomfortable at a past point in time.

Conversationalists can create the present perfect using a combination of auxiliary and main verbs. A combination of the present tense form of the verb *to have* and the past participle of *to be* creates the present perfect:

(4.2.10) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:07:10

*Pat: It **has (.) bee:n**
(0.2)
*Amy: (m[:)
*Pat: [horrific.

(4.2.11) CH:EN_EN4556:STINKY:07:45

*Amy: Thank g[od-
*Pat: [But i'[**ve bee]n** so depre
*Amy: [(Yeah)]

This construction is used to create a temporal construction that commences in the past and might still be relevant to the present. For example, it can also be used to claim that an interlocutor has been depressed for a certain timespan. The present perfect is a powerful tool for doing so as it indicates a time span and not merely a temporal spot.

A similar temporal construction is made with the past perfect. However this has only been observed in one instance. Combining the past tense form of *to have* with the past participle of *to be* achieves this.

(4.2.12) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:01

*Deb: <<f> Anyway i had my hands all full of groceries> (.) so i'm like ok well let me go upstairs and put my groceries down and then (.) <<all> you know> we can go (0.3) have a drink (.) whatever (.) talk about this. Cause i **had been** through a lot of strange feelings about it.

This creates a temporal meaning isolated to the past and relevant to the past only. The present perfect is temporally relevant to the present only.

Various tense constructions create different meaning effects. When conversationalists utilise the past or present, they claim affect and take a stance temporally locatable in the past or in the moment of speaking. This is related to what Chafe (1994) calls “immediate” and “displaced” modes of speaking which were in part accounted for in chapter 3. The distinction between these two concepts is found where the temporal location of a speaker’s consciousness is located. When a speaker’s consciousness is in the immediate mode of speaking, he or she acts or speaks of events as they are occurring. In the displaced mode, the speaker reports or remembers past events. This means that a speaker can claim affect in the present indicated by the present tense.

Using the past tense speakers can claim affect during a temporal span in the past. In fragment 11 Deborah used this construction to signify that she experienced mixed feelings. The temporal construction here makes them not relevant to the present in any way in the sense that the temporal span is isolated to the past. The present perfect can be used to create a temporal progression commenced in the past but relevant in the present. In fragments 9-10 the speakers make claims of affect that originates in the past but is still relevant to the present.

Not only verbs create temporal meaning. Adverbs are also commonly used to create finer temporal or more accurate meanings as Chafe (1994: 205) points out. In fragment 4.2.4 the speaker uses temporal adverb “sometimes” to indicate occasional relevance.

4.3 The affective term

Having described the temporal structures and verb compositions of claims of affect, the present section analysis the function of affective terms are used in these utterances.

Adjectives are the most common affective terms. They can be both concrete and abstract in how they refer to emotion. It may be that they refer directly or metaphorically to the affective state. For example the most straightforward affective terms are *depressed*, *relieved* and *panicked*. These explicitly refer to an affective state and are always encountered with the first person singular pronoun such as in 4.1 and 4.2.10 (recycled below).

(4.3.1) CH:EN_EN4556:STINKY:07:45

*Amy: Thank g[od-
*Pat: [But i'[ve bee]n so **depre**
*Amy: [(Yeah)]

(4.3.2) CH:EN_5907:TIRED:01:25

*Han: O:h i think i'm **dePRESSed.**

In fragment 1 Patricia does not complete her turn. Although clearly she is in the process of producing the adjective *depressed*. She also utilises the intensifier *so* (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987) to upgrade the claim. Fragment 2 shows a fully completed construction using *depressed* as an affective term.

A less clear example of an adjective being a constituent of a claim is *uncomfortable* in 4.2.6 recycled below.

(4.3.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:16:49

*Deb: <<all> I was> VEry **uncomfortable** with it.

This adjective can be used to describe physical discomfort. However it can also be used to describe affective discomfort. The term cross-domain mapping describes this phenomenon (Lakoff, 1993). This concept is used to describe how a word from one domain can be used to describe another abstract concept.

Other examples of adjectives that serve a function in creating claims of affect are *hard* as in 3.2 and *stuck* (shown below). Both these adjectives have to do with force. *Stuck* can be used to refer to a state in which an agent is experiencing immobility. On the other hand, *hard* can be used either to refer to the tactile sensation of an object or of something's ability to apply force to something else.

(4.3.4) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:15:07

*Deb: It's been really **hard** on me: […]

(4.3.5) CH:EN_4157:MIDWEST:09:33

*Broo: But then i see evrybody else getting on with their lives and i'm like (0.2) **stuck.**

In these fragments the utterances can be interpreted as claiming that an external force is acting on the speaker. This idea is closely related to Johnson's (1987) idea of "image schemas". These are gestalt structures that humans attain by interacting with the world. One image schema is that of "force" which humans experience on a daily basis. For example, all human beings know what it feels like to experience an external force applying pressure such as for example having too tight shoelaces. Johnson argues that these force relations are central to language use. In the fragments above, the conversationalists use this force relation to claim that something is affecting or restraining the conversationalist. However the meaning of these utterances should not be thought of in terms of force relations. It should rather be seen as metaphorical extensions or what Johnson calls "metaphorical elaborations" of image-schemas. Thus Deborah is experiencing something that is affecting her. On the other hand Brooke feels that there are no developments in her life.

Occasionally adjectives derived from verbs are used as affective terms. The *-ing* form and *-ed/-en* forms are attached to the verb stem (Crystal, 2008: 352).

(4.3.6) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:31

*Deb: It was
(0.6)
like
(1.1)
tormenting.

(4.3.7) CH:EN_4861:PANICKED:00:46

*Jul: Do you know how (.) **PAnicked** i get over that?

The way Julie structures her question in fragment 7 allows her to use *how* as an intensifier and the *-ed* form of the verb *panic* to create an upgraded adjective predicate. The sentence is structured as follows: The main clause is *do you know* and *how panicked I get over that* functions as a complement clause. In the complement clause the subject is *I*. *Get*, as established in section 4.2, functions as a copular that takes a subject complement. This is in this case *how panicked*. In most instances the complement appears after the copula. However this would most likely make Julie's utterance grammatically unacceptable. More importantly it would in this case move focus from the amount of panic Julie experiences to that it is Julie who is panicking. This analysis is also supported by the fact that she applies stress on the first syllable of *panicked*. In fragment 7, Deborah utilises the suffix *-ing* to use the verb *torment* predicatively. *Tormenting* creates the meaning of a troublesome situation.

This section has investigated the use of affective terms. These consist of adjectives or adjectives derived from verbs. In some instances the claim is established with an affective term constructed with cross-domain mapping. Additionally these constructions create a negatively valenced affective stance which conversationalists use to convey an orientation towards something.

4.4 Candidate linguistic formats

In the previous 3 sections the different linguistic structures and properties that make up the stances of claims of affect have been accounted for. This section considers multiple linguistic structures appearing in the same data fragment that are argued to function in similar ways as claims of affect do.

(4.4.1) CF:ENGS_6269:GLANDS:23:03

692 *John: =°h
693 A:nd the biopsy came back (0.4) maLIgnant.
694 h° °hh A:h at least they (hadnt) found some
695 malignant cells IN it.
696 (0.4)
697 °hhh And then when she took it out (.) and had a
698 biopsy run on it they couldn't find any malignant
699 cells.
670 (0.7)
701 °hhh But nowhh THIS one's swelling up, Huhuhuh
702 °hh A::h it (.) it makes you think about things like
703 that anyway.=

Arguably the first claim of affect is in line 701 and is key to understand the second in lines 702-03. It follows an inbreath and initiated with the conjunction *but* and the temporal adverb *now* followed by *this one's swelling up.* Sequentially it follows an account for tests giving contradictory results. The function of the conjunction is contrastive. It contrasts the development of a new gland with that of an old malignant gland. Thus it implies nervousness about the potential malignancy. This is underlined by the temporal adverb *now* by which he deictically locates the statement in the present context. This is also achieved stressed determiner *this* which modifies the pronoun *one*. Thereby he points to the new swollen gland contrary to the old and implies that the new one might be malignant. It undermines the negative results of the prior tests. These linguistic features convey an affective stance that the new swollen gland is worrying. This is followed by laughter and a terminal inbreath (Jefferson, Sacks & Schegloff, 1987). Inbreaths following laughter invite second speakers to join in. This does not happen in this case either due to potential disalignment or due to the fact that John does not provide adequate space for it as he instantly reclaims the floor.

John then produces *a::h* followed by the second claim affect. Here as shown in section 4.1 the third person pronoun *it* is used. However it does not contains a clear referent. The present tense form of the verb *to make* is used. It behaves monotransitively and takes the direct object in the form of a complement clause *you think about things like that anyway.* As a sentence, this contains the second person singular (or plural) pronoun *you,* which functions as a subject, followed by the verb *think* in present tense, the prepositional phrase *about things like that* and the adverb *anyway*. The prepositional phrase contains the preposition *about* and the head noun *things* which is post-modified by *like that*. *Like* is a preposition creating a comparative link between *things* and *that*. *That* refers back anaphorically. Thereby the utterance confirms that the utterance it refers back to as being an affective stance. The verb *think* and the preposition *about* are used to indicate worry towards *things like that*. This refers back to *but now this one is spoiling it up. Like* is used establish comparability. The utterance ultimately implies that it causes worry to have a new swollen gland when prior have indicated malignancy.

Additional evidence for this analysis can be found in Gerard's empathetic treatment of John's claim of affect (line 704).

(4.4.2) CF:ENGS_6269:GLANDS:23:04

```
701 *John     °hhh But nowhh THIS one's swelling up, Huhuhuh
702           °hh A::h it (.) it makes you think about things like
703           that anyway.=
704 *Ger:     =Well yeah. I think I would too.
```

Gerard's response shows that he treats John's prior turn as being a claim of affect. He first produces *well yeah* in line 703. *Well* is commonly used in conversation to indicate that what follows is to be considered disjunctive to the prior (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). By using this Gerard indicates that his turn is not entirely in conjunction with what would be considered an appropriate response to John's turn. What follows and completes this is a affirming *yeah*. Thereby he confirms the propositional content of John's utterance. Gerard then produces the empathetic statement *I think I would too*. This stance implies that if he were in John's situation he would also be worried and be thinking about cancer.

Another alternative linguistic structure that can be argued to be a claim of affect is the following.

(4.4.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:18:50

```
*Deb:    Oh it was awful and i've been beating myself up
         about it ever since.
```

The linguistic structure of interest here is *and I've been beating myself up about it ever since* which is juxtaposed to the clear claim of affect *it was awful.* What makes this structure a candidate claim of affect is the present perfect verb phrase construction – *'ve been beating (myself) up.* Especially interesting is Deborah's linguistic choice *beating (myself) up* containing the present participle *beating up*. This can both refer to a physically violent retributive action towards someone which in this case is Deborah herself. She is also the agent. This can be observed by her use of the first person pronoun *I* in the subject position. She refers to herself using the reflexive pronoun *myself. S*he uses this in the object position and indicates that she herself is also the patient undergoing the acts of the agent. It is highly doubtable that Deborah is violent towards herself. Rather it can be argued that she is claiming to be psychologically punishing herself. What she has been punishing herself about is the reference *it* appearing within the prepositional phrase *about it.*

In applying this linguistic design, Deborah can be argued to convey an affective state of reflexive anger and indignation for having done something which is left unspecified in the above fragment.

Another type of linguistic construction that can function as a claim of affect is the noun phrase.

(4.4.4) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:14:52

```
9   *Sar:     And what about YOU and the secret police man? Uh Hh
10            [Hh
11  *Deb:     [Oh
12            (.) god.
13            (0.7)
14  *Deb:     W[hat ]a mess.
15  *Sar:      [What]
```

(4.4.5) CH:EN_5254:RELIEVED:00:40

```
56  *Mar:     !NO:! i'm i'm reLIEved i just (.) wanna get on with
57            my LIfe, And i'm wondering what the next step
58            <<all> And who the next person      is gonna be> but
59            i wanna get on because i'm (.) thirtyeight, (0.2)
60            What a [joke. ]
61  *Emi:             [(My go]d)=
62  *Mar:     =You know?
```

Although they are not grammatically complete in the sense that they do not have a subject or a verb, they still function as TCUs. As Schegloff (2007: 3) states, "the basic shapes that TCUs take are sentences or clauses more generally, phrases and lexical items". Even the smallest linguistic items can function as TCUs and have sequential implications. Phrases are no exception to this. The above highlighted phrases are designed to work exclamatorily. The head nouns are prefaced with an indefinite article *a* prefaced by the determiner *what.* This construction creates the meaning effect of something being affectively remarkable. Part of this is due inference and the head noun is used to assess some circumstance. The noun *mess* denotes disorganisation. The noun *joke* is used to orient towards significance of the circumstances. Arguably these items are in the context here used to imply an affective orientation towards a set of circumstances presented in the surrounding talk. *Mess,* for example, can be used that some events are considered disorganised by the speaker. The case of *joke* implies that the speaker considers relations to be ridiculous. Both nouns refer to trouble for the speaker. This implies an affective value.

This section has investigated alternative linguistic formats that are argued to be claims of affect. These have been shown to rely more heavily on inference and verb meaning. It has also been shown that claims of affect arguably do not exclusively need to rely on affective terms. They can be construed via other linguistic means such verbs, adverbs and conjunctions. Inference plays an important role when it comes to interpreting a TCU as being a claim of affect. This was shown in fragments 1 and 2.

4.5 Preliminary conclusion

In sum this chapter has described the linguistic tools used for creating claims of affect. Two distinctive pronouns were found used in claims. One is the first person singular pronoun *I* referring to the claimer. The other is the third person singular pronoun *it*. This was shown not to refer to a single referent. Rather it was shown to function as a "global reference" that refers to abstract referents such as situations, events and various circumstances. The verbs used in claims of affect are primarily copulas. The difference in meaning between *to get, to be* and *to feel* was pointed out. *To get* implied a change of state. *To be* creates a link between the subject and predicate adjective and creates the meaning of being in a state. *To feel* is a sensory verb which is largely introspective and implies that the speaker was evaluating her affectivity. The descriptions of the temporal constructions showed that speakers make claims of affect that are relevant to the past or the present. Additional temporal verb constructions allow the speakers to indicate a claim of affect having started in the past and is continuing. It was also shown how adjectives and adjectives derived from verbs are used as affective terms to create a claim of affect. Others rely on cross-domain mapping and metaphorical extensions of image-schemas. Other candidate constructions were described in section 4.4. These relied more on use of adverbs, verbs and inference than the traditional claims of affect that rely on affective terms.

5 The function of claims of affect

Having successfully described the linguistic features of claims of affect in the previous chapter 4, this chapter analyses their function and discusses their implication for interaction. It will be shown that claimers use affectivity to achieve conversational goals and make their emotions public. Conversationalists keep each other responsible for their affectivity and the justifiability of the claim in relation to the cause. Sequentially claims

of affect can be found in two locations. The first before the cause is presented and the second is after. Each sequential location has different interactional implications for the unfolding conversation and achieves different conversational goals. The conversational partners provide different treatment of the claim in each of these locations.

These features justify the following organisation of this chapter. Section 5.1 investigates sequences where a pre-cause claim of affect generates a new topic and how second speakers treat these. It will be shown that they orient the conversation towards the cause of the emotional response indicated in the claim. Section 5.2 is divided into 2 subsections. Subsection 5.2.1 analyses instances of post-cause claims of affect and aligning responses. Subsection 5.2.2 investigates disaligning responses. In only one case is the disaligning response argued to be the preferred response. In the others, a disaligning response is arguably dispreferred. Explicit dispreferred disalignment is seemingly rare. However discrete paralinguistic features can also achieve disalignment. Section 5.3 concludes the chapter.

5.1 Pre-cause claims of affect

When speakers use pre-cause claims of affect, they introduce their causes as new topics in conversations. The speaker producing the claim produces the cause immediately following. If not a conversational partner orients towards it as missing. The following fragment shows a claim being produced after a previous topic has been closed (lines 24-25).

(5.1.1a) CH:EN_6265:TRIPPING:11:22

```
8   *Luk:     Why don't they go look for another phone.
9             Hh
10  *Har:     Cause there are no PHOnes in this city they're on
11            STRIke?
12  *Luk:     Oh.
13  *Har:     HhHh
14            (0.8)
15  *Har:     °h[h ]The revolution?
16  *Luk:       [()]
17  *Har:     °h[hh h]h
18  *Luk:       [Yeah]
19  *Har:     Heh
20  *Luk:     kh kh kh °h
21            (0.9)
22            Okay.
23            (1.7)
24  *Har:     (Luke) it's it's sad sometimes around here. Very
25            sad and grey a lot,
```

Just prior to Harriet producing her claim, she and Luke end a topic about the people queuing for the phone. That closing is imminent is evident from the production of "second closing thirds" (SCTs) (Schegloff, 2007) as for example in lines 18 and 22. She uses the pronoun *it*. In this case it is referring Harriet's geographical location which is also evident in the prepositional phrase *around here*. She uses the affective term *sad* attributed to *it* using the present tense of the copula *to be.* This indicates that she is speaking in the immediate mode and is claiming it in the moment of speaking. She upgrades her claim by recycling *sad* and adds *grey* upgrading with *very*. This focuses on degree. She also adds *a lot* which is temporal. Just prior she has used the temporal adverb *sometimes* to indicate that it is only sad occasionally. Adding *a lot* makes it more frequent. Thereby she has made public that she perceives her surroundings as being sad which means that Luke will anticipate that a cause is pending.

(5.1.1b) CH:EN_6265:TRIPPING:11:39

```
24  *Har:     (Luke) it's it's sad sometimes around here. Very sad
25            and grey a lot,
26            (4.4)
27  *Luk:     Pourquoi?
28            (0.4)
29  *Har:     (   )
30            (0.6)
31  *Har:     The weather.
32            (0.9)
33  *Luk:     Really?=
34  *Har:     =Only the weather,
35            (3.1)
36  *Har:     Uhm
37            (4.4)
38  *Har:     Oh because <<all> let's see> the other night i was
39            high,
```

Between the claim and Luke's response there is a considerably long pause. This may be because Luke treats the cause of the claim as pending. Evidence for this is the fact that he elicits it with the French interrogative *pourquoi* which he produces with a rising intonation indicating a question. This shows an orientation towards the cause of the claim that Harriet has produced due to the fact that she has not yet provided it. Coulter (1986) had similar findings extendable to the analysis this fragment. He found that when conversationalists are presented with an affective display they begin to look for its cause. The same is at play in the fragment investigated here. Luke orients towards the cause for Harriet's claim which she has not provided immediately following. He

therefore provides her with the opportunity to do so. Coulter concluded in his study that emotion takes an object. The same conclusion is relevant to this fragment.

Harriet provides two causes after Luke orients toward it as missing. The first is the weather (line 31) which Luke replies to with *really*. This can be interpreted as displaying doubt towards the appropriateness of the cause that Harriet has provided for her claim. Harriet repeats it latched to the prior turn. However she modifies it with the adverb *only*. Thereby she implies that it is exclusively the weather. A 3.1-second pause follows which Harriet treats as indicating potential disalignment. This is evident from the fact that she produces an *uhm* followed by another very long pause lasting 4.4 seconds before she finally reveals an appropriate cause for the claim in line 38.

Fragments 1a and b show two things. First of all they show that claims need a cause and that both the claimer and the responder orients towards it when it is missing. Secondly it shows that causes are appropriate to claimed affective response. This is especially evident when the second speaker indicates hesitation towards cause provided and attempts at eliciting a more appropriate one. With *really*, Luke displays reluctance towards accepting *the weather* as the proper cause. Therefore Harriet responds with a new cause. Additionally this suggests that interlocutors orient towards one another's affective states as structured in the way that affective states have causes and these causes may be more or less apt in comparison with others.

The following example shows the same orientation towards the cause of a claim of affect. Here it is elicited by an "itemised news inquiry" (line 9) (Button & Casey, 1985).

(5.1.2) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:14:52

```
9   *Sar:     And what about YOU and the secret police man? Huh
10            huh[ huh
11  *Deb:        [Oh
12            (.) god.
13            (0.7)
14  *Deb:     W[hat ]a mess.
15  *Sar:      [What]
16            (0.6)
17  *Sar:     <<p> What happened?>
18            (1.0)
19  *Deb:     H[e's        mar]ried.
20  *Sar:      [Is he married.]
21  *Deb:     And
22            (0.4)
23            He: (.) his wife (.) just had a baby like (.) like
24            to weeks ago or something.
```

```
25              (0.9)
26  *Sar:       <<p> Wo:w>
27              (0.8)
28  *Deb:       It's been really hard on me: because i
29              (0.6)
30              you know i (.) i have so many (0.3) ideals and
31              principles and everything. And it was like ( )
32              everything just
33              (1.0)
34              went out the window when this all happened because
35              when I MET him i really i didn't know he was
36              married,
```

Sarah inquires about the latest news about Deborah and a man she is interested in. That they have talked about this man before is evident in her referring to him as *the secret policeman.* However Deborah does not respond with the latest news. Rather she produces *oh God*. This response is the first sign of trouble. Next she produces a claim of affect which is formatted exclamatorily. It contains only an adjective phrase which is modified by the determiners *what* and *a*. These in conjunction upgrade the intensity of the head adjective *mess* to describe an affective and contextual disorganisation. This is also evident in her additional claim of affect produced in line 28 where she states that *it's been really hard on me*. *Messy* can therefore be argued to describe the affective state caused by the fact that he is married and has a child.

More importantly Sarah orients towards the claim in a similar way as Luke does in fragment 1b by displaying that it needs a cause with *what's happened.* This utterance's interrogative format is supported by a rising intonation. Deborah meets this interrogative format by producing a SPP presenting the cause. The cause is then that he is married (line 19). As in the previous fragments, the second speaker orients towards the cause by eliciting it. Therefore the claim functions as a topical elicitor providing an opportunity for talking about the cause.

The following fragment shows an example of a claim (line 38) developing out of an extended pre-sequence.

(5.1.3a) CH:EN_5907:SO_TIRED:00:55

```
10  *Han:       Alrighty,
11              (0.5)
12              °hh Well anyway i'm sorry that i didn't call you
13              back on <<all> friday> (.) khh (0.3) goodness sake.
14              (0.8)
15              I don't know what's the matter with me. I'm so
16              TIred i can hardly move.
17              (0.5)
```

```
18  *Liz:     B[ummer.]
19  *Han:      [Ever. ]
20            (1.6)
21  *Liz:     Well?
22            (0.2)
23  *Han:     huhh° (.) [Oh well.]
24  *Liz:               [You don']t really sound
25            (1.0)
26  *Liz:     really the same,
27            (0.6)
28  *Han:     °hh Well th We don't have an awfully good
29            connection.
30            (0.8)
31  *Liz:     I think so. I can hear you okay,
32            (0.4)
33  *Han:     Hm?
34            (0.6)
35  *Liz:     It's just (.) i don't know your voice sounds kind
36            of funny,
37            (1.2)
38  *Han:     O:h i think i'm dePRESSed.
```

Whereas fragments 1a and b showed that claims could follow out of nothing after a prior topic had been closed, the above fragment shows how claims can be methodically introduced by making ones conversational partner notice a problem such as Hannah does (lines 12-13 and lines 15-16). Liz' *well* (line 21) is designed to elicit the cause. She passes this opportunity by producing *oh well*. Liz overlaps (line 24) producing a turn in which she notes that Hannah's voice quality is changed. Hannah blames this on the connection. Liz does a counter in her subsequent turn (lines 31). Hannah then produces a short *hm* ending with a glottal stop which gives it a short emphatic character. Arguably she uses it to display a confused display towards the source. Liz repairs her initial noticing in lines 35-36 followed by Hannah's claim of affect.

The claim is prefaced by an *oh* which is a "change of state" token (Heritage, 1984). It marks the realisation of what the cause is. With the claim itself she attributes the affective term *depressed* to herself or *I* via the copular verb *to be* which in this case is present tense and contracted form – *'m*. The claim is itself contained in a complement clause. In the main clause she indicates that she *thinks*. Thereby she backs down from the certainty of the propositional content of the complement clause. She is speaking in the immediate mode to indicate that what she is feeling is felt in the moment of speaking.

In this example, Hannah indicates lexically that there is a problem. Although no phonetic analysis has been done on this example, it seems evident from the way Liz

treats Hannah's talk that it is designed to elicit something. This is supported by the findings of Local and Walker (2008). They argued similarly that vocal characteristics play a sequential role in getting the opportunity to talk about ones problem. They came to this conclusion by analysing similar sequences as the above where one interlocutor would notice something in the vocal characteristics of their conversational partner. What is also evident in the above fragment is that the vocal behaviour is noted and oriented towards as having a cause. Whereas in fragment 1b Luke oriented Sarah towards her not having provided the cause for the claim, Liz' response is sympathy.

(5.1.3b) CH:EN_5907:SO_TIRED:01:25

```
36  *Han:     O:h i think i'm dePRESSed.
37            (0.9)
38  *Liz:     O::[:h.   ]
39  *Han:       ([Xexexe]) thomas called
40            (1.0)
41            and i MISSed the call,
42            (0.6)
43  *Liz:     O::[:h
44  *Han:        [But on the answering machine he said
45            (0.7)
46            well mom (.) i'm (.) uhm
47            (0.4)
48            ( ) i'm going to memphis tennessee for seven
49            months.
```

Liz' response is arguably expressing sympathy. Evidence for this analysis can be found in line 43 where she recycles *Oh*. However in this context she responds to the cause. In providing Liz with the cause Hannah conveys a conflict: Something good has happened *(Thomas called)*. Yet something bad happened afterwards *(I missed the call)*. That there is a relationship between the two TCUs is evident by the conjunction *and.* This is despite the 1.0-second pause that splits the two and may work as a rhetoric tool. Hannah also underlines the negativity by emphasising the first syllable in *missed*. In the prior fragments Luke oriented towards the cause as missing and provided a slot for it. Here Liz has more invested in the interaction. What this means is that she has noticed a problem indicated by Hannah and pursues it over number of turns. By doing so she also aligns to it as being the accepted cause of the conveyed problem and not for example a bad connection. In other words, it shows an orientation towards the vocal display as indicating trouble that has a cause which may or may not be more or less appropriate. Appropriateness is important here for understanding why Liz accepts *depressed* and not

bad connection. Hannah's first candidate does not fit her conveyed problem in accordance with Liz' expectations. However the second candidate does.

These examples show a clear tendency in the function of claims of affect which is that they are dependent on the cause. This finding supports the assumptions of Coulter (1986) that emotion takes an object. This is based on the finding that second speakers provide the claimers with the opportunity to provide the cause. Responses show that second speakers orient towards the cause when they are met with a claim. This is particularly evident when the claimer does not immediately provide it for them. Another important concept is that of appropriateness between the cause and claim. Second speakers may treat a cause as inappropriate to the claim. The claimer can therefore be required to provide an appropriate one. Another type of response to the claim of affect is the sympathetic one. Prior to this response a problem has already been conveyed. The claim of affect then can be seen as a linguistic realisation of that. With a sympathetic response, the second speaker reaffirms the connection between the paralinguistic cues that lead to the lexicalised claim and the claim itself. The claim of affect can therefore be seen as an intersubjective achievement.

5.2 Post-cause claims of affect

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, post-cause claims of affect are functionally different from pre-cause claims. In general post-cause claims are designed for again making affectivity public and for the second speaker to take a stance towards. It will be shown in subsection 5.2.1 that some claims prefer alignment. However they may not always get it. This is shown in section 5.2.2 which also shows a case of a preferring disalignment. Most claims disprefer disalignment. Disalignment can be achieved in a number of ways such as lexically and paralinguistically. The latter relies on phonetic features and occasionally no features at all to create disalignment other than pauses in between turns. With the first, conversationalists disalign overtly using word level linguistic items.

5.2.1 Alignment

The following fragment is an example of a claim of affect appearing after the cause has been presented (line 188):

(5.2.1a) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:04:53

```
162 *Amy:     You know I tell you it's just been one thing after
163           another.
164           (0.6)
165           And as soon as she has (.) gotten over ONE she's
165           just hit with something else. (.) But when you talk
166           to her she's just wonderful. You know she just
167           really tries to keep her (.) spirits up and
168           (0.8)
169           tries to help evrybody else.
170           (0.9)
171           (The kids) her kids have been great and julie's
172           been great.
173           (0.7)
174 *Pat:     °hh [(  )]
175 *Amy:         [Jul ]ie did get to atlantic city for a month.
176           She rented a place there?=
177 *Pat:     =<<f> O:h.>
178 *Amy:     Yeah (.) so she had a [(.)] good [(.) GOO]D month.
179 *Pat:                           [( )]      [Good.  ]
180           (0.8)
181 *Amy:     It wasn't until the end that (.) that judy
182           (0.5)
183           wasn't
184           (0.3)
185           so well ( ) wasn't feeling so well again?
186           (0.9)
187 *Pat:     U:[ah     ]
188 *Amy:       [<<f>But] it's stinky.>
```

What goes on prior to the claim being produced in line 188 is that Amy is narrating about a cancer struck friend. It is initiated with the conjunction *but* followed by the global referent *it* with the contracted present tense copular verb *–'s* attached. It is followed by the affective term *stinky*. Thus she uses the immediate mode of talking to indicate that this is how she perceives the events in the here and now. Just prior Amy has stated that Judy has *had a good good month* (line 178) and that it was not until the end that she got a setback (lines 181-85). This ends the narrative positively. The claim of affect is used to imply that this is bad despite the positive aspects. That the affective term *stinky* is metaphorical. It describes an unpleasant smell and in the usage here it is used to describe a situation experienced as unfair or negative. Thereby Amy creates an affective stance towards the events she has just described. This stance is affective in nature. This is because she is emotionally affected by what is described immediately before.

Another question is whether the increase in loudness in her turn claiming affect is an indicator of "heightened emotive involvement" or "emphatic speech style". Selting

(1994: 383) argues that one of the characteristics of this speech style is an increased loudness compared to the surrounding speech. Other markers are pitch and accentuation. The question is whether Amy is applying this to her claim of affect. In line 187, Patricia is producing a response cry which Amy overlaps. This overlap may be part of the cause for a raised loudness. However she is applying stress to the first syllable of *stinky* and thereby stresses it. This could be an indicator of a raised involvement.

This fragment shows how a conversationalist by linguistic means creates an affective bond between herself and circumstances related to a friend of hers. Thus she claims that having a friend with cancer has affective consequence for her. Additional evidence for this can be found in Amy's response below.

(5.2.1b) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:05:26

```
187 *Pat:      U:[ah     ]
188 *Amy:        [<<f>But] it's stinky.>
189            (0.2)
190            It [IS.]
191 *Pat:         [I  ]know.=
192 *Amy:      =It i[s  just]
193 *Pat:           [We've h]ad a very stinky u:hm
194            (0.3)
195            We're fine.
```

As Amy emphasises her claim (line 190), Patricia produces the empathetic response *I know* (line 191). Thereby she creates an epistemic stance that indicates that she knows Amy's affectivity. She provides yet more evidence for this analysis by producing her own second story prefaced by a claim of affect in line 193. Although she does not complete the TCU it is evident that she is not assessing a smell but a set of circumstances contributing to a negative experience. This shows that she orients towards Amy's turn as being affective. She recycles the same affective term which she uses describe an experience. She uses the present perfect tense with which she indicates a progression from the past into the present. It also supports that she claims to know how Amy feels. It makes a second story relevant in which she exemplifies her epistemic stance regarding Amy's situation and assesses it as being *stinky* to have a friend with cancer. So in responding empathetically and producing a claim of affect, Patricia makes the talk about the cause relevant. More evidently she claims to know Amy's affectivity.

Additional evidence for this analysis can be found in Patricia's own treatment of a case accounted for in her story. Here, she does two claims of affect that orient towards her own stories as having an affective implication on her.

(5.2.2) CH:EN_4556:STINKY:06:25

```
256 *Pat:     But he's PAralysed on one [side and he's]
257 *Amy:                               [O:h [(.)   go]::d.
258           (0.2)
259           bli (.) half blin[d and then he's]
260 *Amy:                     [O:h            ] (.) what a
261           shame.=
262 *Pat:     =<<f> And>  [so that>   ]
263 *Amy:                 [Is he about] (.) tim's age?
264           (0.4)
265 *Pat:     <<f> Yea[h> a]nd it i mean he's (.) REALly a very
266 *Amy:             [Yeah]
267           good friend and it'[s been hor]rible.
268 *Amy:                        [(Really  )]
269           (Oh [okay)
270 *Pat:         [(But it's been) And his mind seems to be
271           coming back which w[e I mean to] be back
272 *Amy:                        [Oh     okay]
273           almo[st which i]s
274               [Ye:a      ]h
275           (0.2)
276 *Amy:     (X[exe   ])
277 *Pat:       [wonder]ful. But THAT was awful.
```

Patricia does a number of claims of affect after accounting a bicycle crash a friend of hers has been in. She creates an affective bond with the friend *and he's really a very good friend.* This allows her to be emotionally affected by the circumstances. The noun *friend* implies the bond which she upgrades using the adjective *good*. This she underlines with the intensifying adverb *really*. She adds stress to the first syllable of the word. She then produces the claim of affect. She uses the global referent *it* referring to the accident and experience of having a friend in that situation. With *–'s been,* she establishes a temporal span that goes from the accident to the present. It encompasses everything in between and attributes it with the affective term *horrible.*

Returning to fragment 1b and Amy's claim with Patricia's response, fragment 2 shows that Patricia orients toward it as an opportunity to initiate a similar activity where she can present her own similar experiences which ultimately justifies her empathetic response towards Amy's claim of affect. Nevertheless not all responses to claims of affect lead to a second narrative. However in many cases responses to claims are empathetic and claims knowledge of how the claimer is feeling. This can be done in

reference to own experience. In these fragments both women are engaged in narratives that establish them as having an affective connection with people who are struck by illnesses. This affective bond is linguistically realised by the two women and displayed intersubjectively towards each other. Both use their knowledge of their friends and do assessments of them. In effect both conversationalists create their affectivity in the situation by using the linguistic tools at their disposal.

In the following fragment stemming from a conversation between Brooke and Judy, Brooke produces multiple claims of affect.

(5.2.3) CH:EN_4157:SO_JEALOUS:08:52

```
35  *Judy:    No:hohoh
36  *Broo:    [No::] HhhHh ( )[(  )]
37  *Judy:    [Mos ]t of my friends are SINgle i was just SAying
38            like
39            °hhh
40            I mean i'm not the first one to get married at a:ll
41            but STILL. I'm still in like that first BUNCH?=
42  *Broo:    =Oh really?
43  *Judy:    Yeah.
44  *Broo:    Oh my wa:ve must have struck early then because (.)
45            EVerybody i know is married or getting married and i'm
46            (.) SO jealous.
47  *Judy:    Oh really?
48  *Broo:    In fact i was totally my
49            (0.6)
50            my spanish (.) BOYfriend EXboyfriend i don't know
51            what he is (.) but we're always together
52            (0.4)
53            about your wedding? <<all> And i was like> i'm so
54            excited.
55            (0.3)
56            He's gonna be outta town or else i'd make him go
57            and we'd go.
58            (0.6)
59            But [uhm  ]
60  *Judy:        [(But)]
61            (1.0)
62  *Broo:    I was like <<all> i'm just so excited for her I
63            said oh she's so lucky and then they're gonna go
64            live in spain as well> and he's just like ok ok i'm
65            sick of your frie[nds now will you  shut u]p,
66  *Judy:                     [Hh Hh Hh  Hh  Hh  Hh  Hh]
67  *Broo:    [(I) just all i talk about. I'm just] so happy for
68  *Judy:    [Huh    huh     huh      huh     °hh]
69  *Broo:    evrybody.
70            (0.6)
71            But then i see evrybody else getting on with their
72            lives and i'm like (0.2) stuck.
73            (0.4)
74  *Judy:    Oh but it'll be worth the wait. Believe me i KNOW
75            how you feel. HhhHh
76  *Broo:    It's horrid?
```

77 (0.2)
78 *Judy: I know.

The claims are spread across this fragment. Here only some will be highlighted. The first is *and I'm so jealous*. It is done in the present tense by which she is claiming to be jealous in the moment of speaking and in general considering the topic. She treats it as inviting further talk which is a function Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2009: 169) also found. It is also evident from the fact that Brooke expands on this in her response. It functions as a post-cause claim because the cause is presented immediately prior. The cause for her jealousy is then that all her friends are married.

Brooke creates a complex stance in her following narrative. She first of all establishes a positive stance towards her friends getting married. However she also indicates problems with regards to her own relationship with her Spanish gentleman who is positioned as being less than interested (lines 61-65). He is generally portrayed as being at least non-committing to their relationship. Also Brooke does multiple repairs on what their relationship is by repairing *boyfriend* then *ex boyfriend* (lines 50-51). She then creates a negative epistemic stance by stating that she *don't know what he is*. In her self-reported speech indicated by *and I was lik*e, she accounts for an instance where she tells her Spanish boyfriend that she is *excited*. She exits the reported speech in line 67 when she does another claim with which she claims to be *happy*. The claim of affect appearing in the reported speech does not demand a response because it is a report from another conversation and is immediately followed by other information. The multiple claims of affect in this fragment create a complex affectivity with both being happy and jealous. This culminates in the "punchline" (Goodwin, 1985; Jefferson, 1978) of her narrative (line 71-72). The punchline arguably indicates the purpose of the story. In this case, Brooke is being positive towards everybody seemingly getting married or being married. This is contrasted with her own situation. People are *getting on with their lives* and she is *stuck*. This creates an implied claim of affect as feeling stuck in this context creates the meaning of immobility. This is designed to let her complain about her social situation.

Evidence for this can be found in Judy's empathetic response (lines 74-75) and what happens after. First of all, she states that *it will be worth the wait* which implies change for the better. The sentence constructs the future tense using the modal verb *will* and the infinitive form *be*. The global reference and subject *it* is predicated with *worth*

the wait. Judy's authority for stating this comes from her being married and having been in a similar situation. This is evident in the second TCU of her turn where she says *believe me I know how you feel.* Thereby she claims access to Brooke's affective state. She does this by using the imperatively formatted *believe me* to underline her authority. This is followed by the epistemic main clause *I know* and the complement *how you feel*. The complement clause contains the second person singular pronoun *you* referring to Brooke followed by the verb *feel*. The relative adverb *how* is at the head of the clause and refers to the manner of feeling. In effect she uses the imperative *believe me* to emphasise and underline *I know how you feel.* Consequently she enforces her claim of access to Brooke's affective state with additional stress added to *know*. Brooke produces a claim of affect immediately following. The global reference *it* is predicated with the affective term *horrible.* This design is perhaps also the most transparent when it comes to reference to emotion because it appears immediately after access has been claimed by Brooke who aligns again in line 78 with *I know*. Thereby she again claims knowledge to how Brooke is feeling. By doing this Brooke also indicates a presumption that Brooke is feeling in a certain way. This she legitimises by reference to her own authority and experiences.

With these few turns the two interlocutors have arrived at a conclusion that being unmarried and waiting for a proposal to happen is horrible. This means that through interaction and using language they have established an affective relationship. It may be that certain neurological processes are at play that creates the physical response with discontent. It is impossible to know. Ultimately it is not important in this context. What is known is that language is used to construct a reality where Brooke is unmarried, has a noncommittal boyfriend and is happy for everyone but herself. By doing so she implies a complex affective relationship which is used as a complaint mobilised to get a positive reassurance. When Judy states that it will eventually happen, she is reassuring Brooke. Thus Judy is providing her with the prospect of something good happening.

This suggests that claims of affect should be considered public displays. They are linguistically constructed social objects that can be held forward by the claimer for other conversationalist to deal with. In most cases this response is preferred as positively valenced. This means that they confirm that the claimer's affective response

is valid considering the cause. The acceptance or alignment is done empathetically by claiming knowledge of the claimers feelings. Alignment can be achieved by reference to similar experience. This was shown in the above fragments. For example in fragments 1a and b Amy's story sparks a claim which is accepted empathetically by Patricia and triggers a pre-cause claim of affect. It was shown in the previous section that pre-cause claims of affect make talk about the cause relevant. This is also the case here. However the cause is in this case deemed topically relevant to the prior and is therefore arguably used for justifying the claim of knowledge of the claimed affective state.

However this fragment is fundamentally different from fragment 3. This difference may in part be due to the different activities the speakers are engaged in. In fragments 1a and b Amy is producing a narrative on how she is affected by her friend who has cancer. This is an indirect problem for her. However, the person being affected in Brooke's narrative is herself. She is in effect portraying herself as being in trouble socially as she is not getting married. This is therefore having an affective response. Her claims of affect can therefore arguably be seen as both making her affectivity public. However it also objectifies her affectivity so that Judy can treat it as she is the more experienced party.

All these fragments show that claiming affect establishes a causative link between a cause and an affective response. Whereas pre-cause claims of affect make talk about the cause relevant, post-cause claims make an affective negotiation relevant with regards to it being dealt with and aligned to by a second speaker. The claims imply an affective stance towards a set of circumstances that the speaker complains about or is accounting for. When it comes to responses, alignment is in these instances achieved empathetically such as with an experience. A similar experience may manifest itself through a second story as in fragment 1b. In fragment 3, authority and experience were closely connected with the evaluation of a situation eventually changing for the better and claiming knowledge of the affective state of the one undergoing it. These facts also show an orientation toward the appropriateness of claims of affect which may not be fully appreciated at this point in the chapter. It will become more evident in the following subsection. Deborah oriented Judy towards her affective state in the situation and thereby contextualising it.

5.2.2 Disalignment

Having analysed claims of affect and the aligning responses that some of them get how they objectify affectivity, indicate an affective stance towards some circumstance and elicit a particular response. This section will analyse claims of affect receiving disaligning responses from the second speaker. In some instances this is dispreferred. However in one case it is the preferred response type. These responses will show how explicitly that conversationalists orient towards the appropriateness of the claim and its context. In the most explicit case of disalignment, the second speaker may deem the claim inappropriate and ultimately deny the interlocutor the right to her claim. This subsection begins with analyses of less clear and more implicit disaligning responses. Only one instance has been found of a clearly disaligning response to a claim of affect which suggest a preference for alignment.

The following fragment is an example of disalignment, which is implied by paralinguistic features.

(5.2.2.1a) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:12:56

```
8   *Ad:      So I have my little (.) I D ((spelling)) card to go
9             there which is very exciting.
10  *Lu:      [(Xexe)  ]
11  *Ad:      [I'm goin]g there tomorrow.
12            °hh[h   ]
13  *Lu:         [That] is wonderful.
14            (0.7)
15  *Ad:      Yeah.
16            (0.4)
17  *Ad:      But i had to explain in kind of (.) great detail
18            (what) my research was.
19  *Lu:      (Yes)
20            (0.7)
21  *Ad:      Yeah
22            (0.3)
23  *Lu:      Yeah
24            (1.3)
25  *Lu:      Well that's good.
26            (0.2)
27  *Lu:      That'll give you something
28            (0.7)
29  *Lu:      to do:,
30            (0.4)
31  *Ad:      M:-
32            Yeah,
33            (0.4)
34            °hhh
35            But a:hh every time i go up to that bunac office to
36            look at like part time jobs and stuff they're just
37            so crappy.
38            (0.3)
```

```
39  *Lu:      Oh-
40            (1.0)
41  *Ad:      I mean it's like (.) literally chambermaid jobs.
42            (0.2)
43  *Lu:      Mhm-
44            (0.2)
45  *Ad:      For like four (.) twenty-five an hour.
46            (0.9)
47  *Lu:      Mhmm-
48            (1.1)
49  *Ad:      Like i mean REALly yucky.
50            (0.8)
51  *Lu:      Mhm-
52            (2.2)
53  *Ad:      So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that,
54            (0.5)
55  *Lu:      Sure-
```

Adele's claim of affect (line 53) is achieved through a series of upgraded assessments and "extreme case formulations" (Pomerantz, 1986) about locally available jobs. Just prior (line 25), Lucy assesses *well that's good*. Subsequently in lines 27-29, she concludes *that'll give you something to do* at the prospect of Adele going to the British Library to do her research. Adele's responses *m* (line 31) and *yeah* (line 32) are marking receipt of Lucy's assessment. What she does next (lines 35-37) shows that she treats Lucy's prior turn at talk as positioning her as being idle. The topical cohesion is enforced by the contrasting conjunction *but*. It indicates that the propositional content of what is to follow contrasts with the prior. Here she excuses and defends her idleness by characterising the available jobs as being *so crappy*. Thereby she is implying that they are not worth it. Also present is an extreme case formulation *every time* suggesting that the event is recurring. Lucy replies with *oh*. Adele treats this response as doing disalignment which can be observed in line 41 where she does self-initiated repair on her prior turn (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). This is indicated with *I mean*. Having initially been characterised with the adjective *crappy*, they are now characterised as *literally chambermaid jobs* which functions as an upgraded assessment. *Literally* denotes exactness of the propositional content and the noun *chambermaid jobs* implies a job not worth taking. This disalignment and upgrade repeats over a couple of turns until the claim of affect is produced.

As it can be observed Adele is trying to get Lucy to align to her idleness being caused by the nature of the available jobs. Lucy's pending disalignment suggests that this is not a viable cause. Stevanovic (2012) showed how phonetic features are

interactionally significant in decision-making sequence. By investigating Finnish workplace interaction she found that assessments or "approval turns" of prior propositions with a flat intonation halts a decision from being made. This suggests that the phonetic design is salient for the unfolding sequence. In Adele and Lucy's conversation Lucy's minimal responses are negligible in that they are linguistically sparse, phonetically short with a flat intonation. Adele treats this as displaying disalignment.

Adele's claim of affect (line 53) can be seen as another attempt at supporting her own stance and eliciting alignment from Lucy. In doing so she brings an affective dimension into the conversation. It creates an affective link between the jobs and Adele. She is depressed due to a lack of appropriate jobs. She uses the causative *so* to indicate this. The jobs are referred to in the prepositional phrase *about that*. She does a slight mitigation with the contracted phrase *kinda* implying the she is somewhat or something related depressed.

However the claim of affect gets only a minimal response which on the surface aligns. The prosody is again flat. As evident from Adele's response this is not doing alignment. As a consequence of this, neither of the participants is willing to back down. Therefore the sequence ultimately dies out with a topic change line 81.

(5.2.2.1b) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23

```
53  *Ad:      So (.) i'm kinda depressed about that,
54            (0.5)
55  *Lu:      Sure-
56            (1.3)
57  *Ad:      I mean if they Well i mean if you know if it's
58            (0.9)
59            you know means to an end this like whole (.)
60            program or whatever for me. But °hhh but °hh if i'd
61            known in advance °hhh
62            (0.7)
63            that the only jobs that i could get would be like
64            bartending.
65            (0.3)
66  *Lu:      Mh[m-
67  *Ad:        [Well here bartending isn't even bartending cause
68            no one gets mixed drinks they only get
69            (0.4)
70            bitter or ale or beer (and) you [know  (draughts)].
71  *Lu:                                      [huh (0.2) hh (.)]heh
72            hehehe
73  *Ad:      And they're a:ll on tap so.
74            (0.2)
75  *Lu:      Uh huh.
76            (0.6)
```

```
77  *Ad:      <<p> Mm yeah>
78            (0.9)
79  *Lu:      (Yeah)
80            (1.0)
81  *Ade:     And how is Thomas?
```

In backing down, Adele changes the topic gradually. Firstly she makes one more effort to achieve alignment. She takes an evaluative stance towards the academic program she is enrolled in. She characterises it as *means to an end* (lines 57 and 59-61). This suggests that what she is doing is necesarry to achieve a certain goal which she does not specify. Despite it being necesarry she infers that bartending is not (63-64). She does this by using the contrasting conjunction *but* heading the utterance followed by the conjunction *if*. Together these establish and indicate a hypothetical epistemic stance. The stance is created with a first person pronoun and the past perfect tense verb phrase *I'd known*. As argued previously the verb *know* is used to refer to a knowledge state. The fact that she uses the past perfect here suggest that if she had known some set of circumstances then the meaning would have been different. She makes explicit the set of circumstances in the complement clause *that the only jobs would be like bartending*. Although she never makes the outcome explicit.

However, this does not make Lucy provide an aligning response. This makes Adele abandon the topic gradually over her following turns. These two fragments show first of all that disalignment does not have to be achieved by lexical means. It can rely on paralinguistic features. They show how different stances can collide only to die out when neither conversationalists is willing to back down from their view. A second speaker can hold a first speaker in check with very minimal linguistic means when deeming her claim unjust. It also suggests that personal views and emotions may be genuine enough. Yet that does not mean that the second speaker has to accept either as she may indicate a mismatch between the cause and the claim. The post-cause claim of affect is produced in order to achieve a particular goal. In the above fragment for example, Adele does this to achieve alignment which will confirm that she is justly idle. A second speaker responding to an interlocutor's claim of affect may show reluctance towards the proper fitting of the emotion to the context if she considers it inappropriate. In the prior fragment for example, Lucy conveys that the nature of the available jobs is not a viable excuse for being idle. She does this by formatting her minimal responses as negligible as possible. Thereby she implies that substandard jobs are not valid causes

for being depressed and idle. This means that interlocutors monitor and indeed judge their co-conversationalists' social and indeed private affective lives. Not only do second speakers do this. First speakers actively seek confirmation for their affect and its relation to other circumstances and they use it to achieve conversational goals such as in this example where Adele is trying to justify not having a job. This then suggests that affectivity is not as private as some theorists and researchers suggest (cf. Heritage, 2008). It is in fact a social tool that has multiple social functions.

It is important to recall here that in studying claims of affect it is possible to avoid a subjective interpretation of paralinguistic features and attributing them to certain affective and psychological states such as some have (cf. Cowie, 2000; Ververidis & Kotropoulos, 2006). Claims of affect provide a lexical access and are therefore present at word level. Furthermore second speakers orient towards these as displaying affectivity that may be more or less appropriate. This means that the researcher does not have to rely on his or her intuition to interpret controversial linguistic features. Additionally other researchers have argued that phonetic features are more important for the sequential organisation rather than simple conveying an affective state (cf. Local & Walker, 2008; Ogden, 2006). This was also suggested in the section on pre-cause claims of affect.

Returning to the matter of disalignigment it may be the case that the preferred response is a disaligning one as the following fragments will be used to show that this is due to the contextual environment it is located in. The following analysis will show how a conversationalist by linguistic means claims affect in order to deal with her guilt with a married man with whom she has had a relationship with. She recounts an event with him kissing her and describes her emotions in that situation using claims of affect made in the past tense and then produces claims in the present to indicate guilt.

(5.2.2.2) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN18:24

```
191 *Deb:     Well one thing turns into anothe:r he was holding
192           my HAND (.) he KISSes me.
193           [It was] awful and [then he]
194 *Sar:     [M:    ]           [(mhm)  ]
195           (0.3)
196 *Deb:     It was
197           (0.6)
198           like
199           (1.1)
200           tormenting.
```

```
201            (0.5)
202            I i (.) (so) I'm such a jerk mean i (.) i feel like
203            i committed adultery. I mean nothing happened. I
204            mean we kissed. (0.2) But that was it. [But i] feel
205 *Sar:                                                [mhmm ]
206            (0.7)
207 *Deb:       so guilty and horrible and here this conversation
208            is being taped and they'll probably track me
209            d[own   put]
210 *Sar:        [No:Huhuhuh]
211 *Deb:       me in jail or i don't know.
212 *Sar:       Ah [Huhuh]
213 *Deb:          [°h   ]h
214 *Sar:       Hh°
215 *Deb:       Oh it was awful and i've been beating myself up
216            about it ever since.
217            (1.3)
218            And anyway so he finally left and
```

Here she produces an array of claims of affect that are claimed retrospectively. This means they are produced in the past tense to describe an emotion connected to a previous situation. The first is produced at a point where the event she is narrating reaches a crucial point with him kissing her (lines 191-92). Her linguistic formatting and claims of affect work in conjunction to portray him as the agent and her as the patient who unwillingly succumbs to his advances. This is observable in her use of personal pronouns which she uses to establish him as the agent and her as the patient such as in *he was holding* and *he kisses*. In these two examples the object of the sentence is related to Deborah. In the last example, she refers to herself with the pronoun *me* and thus indicates that she is the patient undergoing an action by the agent. The same is the case in the first example. However the reference is based on meronymy. She refers to a body part of hers with the possessive determiner *my* and the noun *hand.* As a consequence she is the patient again. Thereby she indicates that she had no doing in the actions she accounts for.

It is in this light that the claims of affect should be seen as preferring disalignment. She produces her claim of affect *it was awful* (line 193) which refers to the experience of being kissed in that situation. She begins production of a juxtaposed sentence which she abandons as Sarah produces two minimal responses in overlap. What exactly Sarah is responding to is somewhat unclear. The first *mhm* overlaps the first part of the prior turn which is too early for a response to the claim. It must therefore be a response to immediately prior. The last *mhm* is produced in time for it to be a response to the claim of affect. Its production also coincides with Deborah cancelling

the juxtaposed TCU. Interestingly Deborah produces another claim of affect *it was like tormenting* immediately following (lines 196-200). She does not receive any response which can be observed in the pause (line 201). The first two claims are produced in the past tense to describe the way she was feeling in the situation.

Subsequently she says *I'm such a jerk.* This is a "self-deprecation" (Pomerantz, 1984) which gets no response arguably due to the fact that she continues immediately. She then states that *nothing happened.* This she repairs with *I mean we kissed* and *but that was it.* She then produces a claim of affect with two juxtaposed affective terms *guilty* and *horrible* which is upgraded with the adverbial *so.* The combination of nothing happening except kissing and a claim of affect that implies feeling guilty is a contradiction. Stating that having done nothing and feeling guilty is designed provoke a response that confirms she had no responsibility in the events. Fundamentally Deborah is not the wrongdoer in her own view. This can be deducted from her linguistic design. Deborah attempts to support this making the man the agent in the events. Two more claims of affect are produced juxtapositioned to each other. The first, *oh it was awful,* follows the traditional characteristics of claims of affect. The latter simply implies it. Here she indicates that she has been *beating herself up*. This is not a physical punishment she is forcing upon herself. Rather, it infers a certain amount of feeling guilty. Following this is a 1.3-second pause.

As argued these claims are designed to get Sarah to confirm that Deborah is not responsible and therefore should not react affectively. The claims get no immediate response however other than minimal responses. This happens later in the conversation.

(5.2.2.3) CH:EN_4660:POLICEMAN:20:44

```
331 *Deb:     It's hard to
332           (1.1)
333           walk away from it. You know wha[t i mean]? It's
334 *Sar:                                      [R i g h ]t
335 *Deb:     hard not to have any feelings about it. I feel like
336           i'm just (.) by my (.) self. <<all But anyway.>>
337           (1.6)
338 *Sar:     W[ell it's no]t in anyway like you
339 *Deb:      [Huhhh°     ]
340           (1.4)
341 *Sar:     pursued him or seduced him or !A!nything. I mean i
342           (.) i hope you can
343           (1.3)
344           try not t[o beat yourself u]p (.) too much.
345 *Deb:               [Yeah             ]
346 *Sar:     Because
```

```
347            (0.4)
348            I mean
349            (1.2)
350 *Deb:       I feel good about that.
```

Here Sarah responds with *well it's not in anyway like you pursued him or seduced him or anything*. By doing this she denies her as being agent and having acted with ill will. She goes on in her following TCU (lines 338-344) to orient towards Deborah's affectivity. She states that Deborah should *try not to beat* herself up about it. This implies that she should not punish herself affectively. However Sarah does not say that Deborah should not be entirely without out guilt either. For example, the adverbial phrase *too much* refers to measure which is modified by the adverb *too*. Together they create the meaning of not overdoing something. In the conversational context it implies that Deborah should not overdo feeling guilty.

Fragments 2 and 3 show another function of claims of affect than their occurrence in sequences that have been previously analysed. They show an instance of a claims seeking disalignment. Others have shown to seek alignment. However both functions point towards the same thing: namely that affectivity is inherently a social phenomenon. For example in certain contexts a speaker can be obliged to feel in one way. In other contexts he or she is not. If another conversationalist deems that these standards are not met, she can deny the claimer her right to have the emotion.

This shows that interlocutors can claim to feel in a certain way and use linguistic items to deal with emotional and moral problems. Deborah linguistically and interactionally portrays herself as feeling guilty. Yet simultaneously she indicates not having done anything. In doing so she works towards a confirmation that she should not feel in a certain manner. She is ultimately trying to rid herself of any responsibility she might have had in the situation. Deborah looks towards Sarah for an indication of how she should feel and Sarah provides her with this when she states that she should not beat herself up. Thus Sarah has evaluated the circumstances Deborah has described and judged that she is not eligible for the affective punishment she claims to be going through. She thereby disaligns towards the claims of affect that Deborah is producing which is a response that is arguably preferred.

However disalignment is usually dispreferred as the following fragment is testament to. It stems from a conversation between Mom and Julianne where Julianne produces a claim that Mom disaligns to:

(5.2.2.4) CH:EN_4861:PANICKED:00:28

```
30  *Mom:     I'm disappointed that (0.3) th[at ]
31  *Jul:                                    [Sha]ll i quit? You know?
32            I mean h°
33  *Mom:     <<h> NO.>
34            No Julie. You have to do what YOU wanna do. I'm
35            disappointed that i
36            (0.5)
37            that i don't (.) see
38            (0.5)
39            I don't see where this is getting you. I i don't see
40            (0.4)
41            I don't see really (.) ( ) (.) what it is (.) that (.)
42            that you wanna
43            (0.3)
44  *Jul:     I don't i have NO idea oka:y?
45            (0.4)
46            Do you know how (.) PAnicked i get over that? I've: NO
47            idea what i wan[na do.]
48  *Mom:                    [Well  ](.) i am ALso disappointed that
49            you get panicked over that because i don't think that's
50            at !ALL!
51            (0.7)
52            u::m
53            (0.5)
54            at at all called for and that's where i'm
55            disappointed in <<h>myself> because (.) obviously i
56            didn't do a good enough [job   of  raising   you.]
57  *Jul:                             [<<p> tsk °hh  (.)  oh   ]
58            stop that,>
```

What Mom does with her response (line 48 onwards) is to deny Julianne's claimed affectivity (lines 46-47). This claim is produced after Mom has displayed a negative stance towards the job Julianne has undertaken (line 39) and her future plans (lines 41-42). The stance is achieved with negative adverb *not* in its contracted form *–n't.* This attached to the auxiliary verb *do* before the main verb *see.* With this construction she conveys uncertainty about what is contained in the complement clause *where this is getting you* referring to the prospects of the job. The relative adverb *where* refers to a geographical location andmetaphorically extends to prospects of a future career referred to with *this*. It functions as an agent while Julianne is patient of the metaphorical movement. Thereby Mom constructs the abstract meaning of a job with future prospects that she is unaware of. The second stance she creates is one towards Julianne's future plans in an incomplete TCU. She uses the interrogative determiner *what* to modify *it*. Jointly the construction enquires about additional information. These appear before the copula *is*. The complement clause *that you wanna do* is incomplete but is arguably meant to refer to Julianne's future plans.

Julianne aligns using a negative format creating a negative epistemic stance (line 44). Thus she confirms Moms' observation and indicates having no knowledge of what she wants to do and thereby she confirms what Mom has said prior. The TCU is completed with the interrogative *okay* which points to Mom for confirmation. This is additionally supported by it having a rising intonation at the end. However no response is given immediately following which can be observed in the 0.4-second pause following. She then produces an interrogatively formatted claim of affect followed by a repeat of her negative epistemic stance (lines 46-47). It is interrogatively formatted by means of the auxiliary verb *do* being moved in front of the subject which is the second person singular pronoun *you* referring to Mom. The main verb is *know*. It refers to Mom's knowledge of *how panicked I get over that*. *How* is placed before the affective term *panicked.* This construction refers to the amount of panic she experiences. She refers to herself using the pronoun *I.* A link is established between the affective term and the pronoun with the copula *get*. The prepositional phrase *over that* refers to her not knowing what her future plans are or what she wants to do.

As it can be seen from Mom's response, she is not following Julianne's projected turn of conversational events. She initiates her TCU partly in overlap with *well* which prior researchers have argued displays an orientation to the response not adhering to the format projected by the question (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). She then produces *I'm also disappointed that you get panicked over that.* This is a claim of affect utilising the affective term *disappointed.* She attributes this to herself. The thing she is panicked over is contained in the adjectival complement clause *that you get panicked over that*. This recycles linguistic elements from Julianne's prior turn. The cause follows which can be paraphrased as *because I don't think that's at all called for.* With this cause, she implies that Julianne's claim of affect is not justifiable. This is achieved by creating a negative stance using the contracted negative adverb *–n't* attached to the auxiliary verb *do.* This is followed by the main verb *think* which arguably implies that it is Mom's conviction that it is not called for. The conviction is contained within the complement clause *that's at all called for*. *That* is used as a pronoun referring to Julianne's claimed affectivity. The verb phrase consists of the contracted copula *–'s* and the main verb *called* which takes the preposition *for.* The grammatical analysis is slightly awkward due to *at all* being inserted into the verb phrase for additional

emphasis. The verb construction *called for* implies that something is needed. Seeing as the main clause creates the negative stance, Mom conveys that the affectivity Julianne claims is not needed or justifiable in the context.

This fragment is the only one there is of dispreferred disalignment to a claim. It provides the strongest case for affectivity being dependent on appropriateness. It also shows that Mom orients towards Julianne's claim not as illusive and belonging to her psychological state. Rather she supposes that it is a social object she is allowed to handle. She does this from her vantage point and thus indicates that it is her stance and conviction. The claim of affect that Julianne produces is not viable in her optics. More importantly this extract shows that conversationalists show little apprehension towards commenting and presenting their views on how their conversational partners feel. Mom does not convey that she assumes Julianne is not in a state of panic. She indicates no orientation towards the truth-value of the affective state. As it can be seen, she assumes that Julianne is panicked because she produces a claim of affect where she establishes that she is disappointed in Julianne for being panicky about it. Thereby she is not in accordance with Mom's view. Julianne's claim of affect is neither designed to suggest the existence of an affective state. In fact it is designed to orient Mom towards her affectivity. In a way it assumes that Mom should be aware of her reaction. This is so because it is interrogatively formatted and orients towards Mom's knowledge. Thus there are no indications from either of the conversationalists that the panic Julianne claims is not genuine.

These fragments show that conversationalists make public their affectivity to achieve various conversational goals. In Julianne's case she orients Mom towards her affectivity with regards to the topic and thereby implies that not having any future plans has an affective cause. This suggests that affectivity is a social construct and socially managed by conversationalists through language. Julianne brings her affectivity into the conversation and orients her conversational partner towards it.

That they are socially construed means that they are a product of human social life. Take the case of Deborah who had an affair with a married man. She conveys a feeling of guilt which is the result of this affair. Thus she conveys awareness of her culpability. In her attempt to manage this guilt she uses language in interaction to portray herself as more of a victim than a culprit. In order to truly manage the guilt

feeling she needs confirmation from a third party that this is so. This she achieves from Sarah ultimately. As already stated she must rely on language to achieve this which this chapter has shown with analyses of multiple fragments containing claims of affect.

5.3 Conclusion

In sum it has analysed and discussed the interactional functions and implications of claims of affect and how second speakers respond them to. Two sequential locations have been investigated. The first is that of pre-cause claims of affect. Interlocutors use these to attain an opportunity to talk about the cause. If a cause is not immediately presented, second speakers will orient towards this fact. The other sequential environment is post-cause claims of affect. Typically these are designed to elicit alignment from second speakers. Only one instance was found of a claim being used to elicit disalignment (see fragments 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.3). Here the conversationalist was managing her guilt feeling by negotiating it with her conversational partner. Only a few instances have been found of disalignment to claims designed to elicit alignment. In only one case is this done explicitly.

These findings suggest that affectivity is a public phenomenon which both interlocutors orient to as negotiable. This is contrary to the previous assumption that affectivity and emotion are intrinsically personal and private to the individual. Indeed these fragments have shown that emotionality is as much a product of social interaction as it is of potential brain activity or individual psychology. This is astounding in the way that people do not view the affectivity of others as being out of bounds. Instead they rather see it as a concrete social object that they can take in their hands and deal with through language and interaction. The claimer may actively pursue an aligning response to conclude that she is feeling in the right manner or a disaligning response that she should not feel bad about something. On the other hand the second speaker can either confirm that the claim is genuinely justifiable or that the affective response is unwarranted by the situation. These findings suggest that affectivity and emotion are intrinsically social and that they can be interactionally managed and negotiated.

6 Conclusion and further studies

This study has investigated a phenomenon called “claims of affect”. These are linguistic expressions that conversationalists utilise for making their affectivity public. This is

done to achieve conversational goals and to let their conversational partners across the doorstep into their emotional lives. Their linguistic designs have been shown to be versatile. Yet two general formats are commonly found. For example, the claimer can refer to herself with the pronoun *I*. She can also use the third person singular pronoun *it* to refer to a larger context. This pronoun has been shown not refer to one referent. Rather it encompasses multiple and larger, abstract referents. With regards to verbs, claims rely heavily on copular verbs except for claims that rely on other features such as inference. The copular verb creates an attributive link between the predicate and the subject. The predicate is usually an adjective with affective value. It has therefore been coined "the affective term". An adjective can either refer directly to an affective state such as being *depressed*. However, numerous instances have been found of adjectives that are used metaphorically such as for example *hard*. A few claims of affect do not rely on these features. Rather they rely on inferences to be made by the second speaker.

Sequentially claims have been found in two positions. The first is "pre-cause claims of affect" which appear before the cause is presented. The second is "post-cause claims of affect". What the claims achieve conversationally and interactionally in each position is different. Pre-cause claims are designed to evoke an opportunity for talking about the cause. This was shown to be the case because second speakers orient to the cause as missing if it is not produced immediately after. The function of post-cause claims of affect is to elicit either an aligning or disaligning response from the second speaker. The question of which is produced depends on preference organisation. In the majority of cases, the claim prefers an aligning response. In only one instance is disalignment the preferred response to the claim of affect. As stated this is dependent on preference organisation. It is achieved by the activity designed to successfully reach a particular goal. In the case investigated here, the claimer sought to have her affective response disconfirmed in order not to feel guilty. Dispreferred disalignment has also been observed. No instances of dispreffered alignment have been found yet.

Both pre-and post-cause claims of affect have functions that point towards affectivity as being a highly social object. As has been shown the case is that emotion takes an object which is the cause. With pre-cause claims the claimer makes public an emotion which consequently enforces this relationship between cause and emotion. This also means that if a cause is not provided, then second speakers will begin to look for it.

When it comes to post-cause claims of affect, they have been shown to elicit a response from the second speaker that either confirms or denies the claimer's emotionality. This confirmation is always based on the appropriateness of the causative link between the cause and the affective reaction. The cause can be too weak and the affective reaction can be too strong. Therefore it can ultimately result in a dispreferred response.

A claim of affect is produced to achieve some goal in the conversation. For example, a conversationalist may want to deal with guilt and is therefore looking to another conversationalist to do so. It may be that the conversationalist wants reassurance. He or she is therefore accounting for causative circumstances and the affective reaction. In doing so the conversationalist obliges his or her conversational partner to respond. This means that claimers look towards their conversational partners for indications of how they should feel.

Another finding has been that speakers claim access to each others emotions presented with a claim of affect. These responses are aligning and done empathetically. The empathetic response is done with reference to similar experience. When done with reference to similar experience one potential outcome is a topically related second story.

All in all this analysis points towards affectivity as being not an abstract psychological phenomenon isolated to the individual or the brain. Instead it is a strongly present factor in everyday social interaction. It is negotiated through linguistic means in interaction. Thus where prior researchers have suggested that emotion is a private, unobservable and psychological phenomenon (cf. Heritage, 2008), this study has shown that conversationalists do not necessarily view it in the same manner when it comes to claims of affect. Both speakers treat these as conveying the affective state of the speaker. On occasion, however, they can be seen as unjust in the eyes of the second speakers if the causative link is considered invalid. Thereby the claimer is claiming too much.

Some aspects of claims of affect still remain to be studied to provide a better understanding of this phenomenon. The present study has been unable to deal with these due to time constraints. Researchers have argued that phonetic features are responsible for sequential organisation. The question therefore remains to what extent the prosodic features of pre-and post-cause claims of affect work towards getting a particular type of response from the second speaker. This potential investigation could shed light on the

controversial issue of whether psychological states can be attributed to certain phonetic features or not. Claims of affect are a prime target for this investigation as they indicate affectivity at the lexical level which this study has shown both conversationalists orient towards. Thus if the phonetic features support the linguistic design of the claims of affect, there could be reason to suspect that they convey affective states. However the phonetic designs of the claims seem to be too disparate to generalise over. Some are produced noticeably louder than others and some are very quiet. Some seem flat whereas others vary in intonation. Researchers might find that these features work more towards organising sequence and play its part in achieving conversational goals which claims of affect have been shown to do.

Another endeavour, which this data is not large enough for, is gender studies. The majority of claims have been found in conversations between female speakers. One was found produced by a female speaker to a male and only one has been found produced by a male to another male. Investigating the linguistic design that women and men utilise when making claims of affect can show how the two genders go about talking about emotion. In the one example in this study of a male producing a claim, the claim itself is implied and relies heavily on inference. Whether this manner of using claims of affect is symptomatic for males remains to be investigated.

Appdendix

Cross-references

Reference to the fragment's location in the paper and in the corpora is indicated above each fragment (an example can be seen below). The numbers in the parentheses refers to the location in the paper. Everything that appears before the very last number refers to chapter, section, and subsection. The number appearing last indicate fragment number in that section or subsection. This number resets in each new chapter or section. Next appears an abbreviation referring to the CallFriend (CF) or the CallHome (CH) corpora. Then follows the name of the phone call, which is split into two parts. The first is the coded reference, which is a couple of letters and a number. In the above fragment, this is *ENGS6269*. The second is the name given to the conversation by the researcher. This is for ease of recollection and reference, as the name indicates what a given fragment in that conversation is about. The below fragment's given name is *GLANDS*.

Last in the reference line is the time code, used for referring to its location in the audio file. This is indicated in minutes and seconds.

```
(1.1) CH:EN_4092:YUCKY:13:23
```

Definitions

GAT 2 transcription conventions

Type	Symbol	Explanation
Sequential organisation		
	=	Latching
	[ ]	Overlapping
	[ ]	
Pauses		
	(.)	Micro pause, shorter than 0.2 sec.
	(1.5)	Measured pause
Segmental units		
	:	Symbol covers approximately 0.3 second of prolongation. Multiple symbols can be used for longer cases.
In – or exhalation		
	°h / h°	Symbol covers approximately 0.3 second of in-or exhalation. Multiple symbols can be used in conjunction for longer occurrences.
Laughter/weeping		
	Hahah	Laughter indication
Accentuation		
	TRANscript	Main stress
	!TRAN!script	Extra stress
Segmentals		
	?	Glottal stop*
Pitch movement at TCU end		
	?	Rising
	'	Mid rising
	-	Flat
	.	Falling
New TCU		
	Transcript	A capital letter at the beginning of a word and a TCU means a new TCU.
Pitch register		
	<<h> >	High register
	<<l> >	Low register
Dynamics		
	<<f> >	Forte, loud
	<<p> >	Piano, quiet/soft
	<<all> >	Allegro, fast
	<<len> >	Lento, slow
Other		
	( )	Incomprehensible

(xexexe)	Incomprehensible but with indication of number of syllables
(Transcription)	Transcriber guess
[…]	Parts have been omitted from the transcript‡

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‡ Added convention

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